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Abstract
We propose a new variant of the group activity selection problem (GASP), where the
agents are placed on a social network and activities can only be assigned to connected
subgroups (gGASP). We show that if multiple groups can simultaneously engage in the
same activity, finding a stable outcome is easy as long as the network is acyclic. In contrast,
if each activity can be assigned to a single group only, finding stable outcomes becomes
computationally intractable, even if the underlying network is very simple: the problem of
determining whether a given instance of a gGASP admits a Nash stable outcome turns out
to be NP-hard when the social network is a path or a star, or if the size of each connected
component is bounded by a constant. We then study the parameterized complexity of
finding outcomes of gGASP that are Nash stable, individually stable or core stable. For
the parameter ‘number of activities’, we propose an FPT algorithm for Nash stability for
the case where the social network is acyclic and obtain a W[1]-hardness result for cliques
(i.e., for standard GASP); similar results hold for individual stability. In contrast, finding a
core stable outcome is hard even if the number of activities is bounded by a small constant,
both for standard GASP and when the social network is a star. For the parameter ‘number
of players’, all problems we consider are in XP for arbitrary social networks; on the other
hand, we prove W[1]-hardness results with respect to the parameter ‘number of players’ for
the case where the social network is a clique. 1
1. Introduction
Companies assign their employees to different departments, large decision-making bodies
split their members into expert committees, and university faculty form research groups:
division of labor, and thus group formation, is everywhere. For a given assignment of agents
to activities (such as management, product development, or marketing) to be successful,
two considerations are particularly important: the agents need to be capable to work on
their activity, and they should be willing to cooperate with other members of their group.
Many relevant aspects of this setting are captured by the group activity selection problem
(GASP), introduced by Darmann et al. (2012). In GASP, players have preferences over pairs
of the form (activity, group size). The intuition behind this formulation is that certain tasks
are best performed in small or large groups, and agents may differ in their preferences over
1. Preliminary versions of this article appeared in Proceedings of the 31st AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (Igarashi et al., 2017), and Proceedings of the 16th International Joint Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems (Igarashi et al., 2017). In this longer version, we provide
all proofs that were omitted from the conference version and improve some of the results.
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group sizes; however, they are indifferent about other group members’ identities. In the
analysis of GASP, desirable outcomes correspond to stable and/or optimal assignments of
players to activities, i.e., assignments that are resistant to player deviations and/or that
maximize the total welfare.
The basic model of GASP ignores the relationships among the agents: Do they know each
other? Are their working styles and personalities compatible? Typically, we cannot afford
to ask each agent about her preferences over all pairs of the form (coalition, activity), as the
number of possible coalitions grows quickly with the number of agents. A more practical
alternative is to adopt the ideas of Myerson (1977) and assume that the relationships among
the agents are encoded by a social network, i.e., an undirected graph where nodes correspond
to players and edges represent communication links between them; one can then require that
each group is connected with respect to this graph.
In this paper we extend the basic model of GASP to take into account the agents’ social
network (gGASP). We formulate several notions of stability for this setting, including Nash
stability and core stability, and study the complexity of computing stable outcomes in our
model. These notions of stability are inspired by the hedonic games literature (Banerjee
et al., 2001; Bogomolnaia & Jackson, 2002), and were applied in the GASP setting by
Darmann et al. (2012) and Darmann (2015).
Hedonic games on social networks were recently considered by Igarashi and Elkind (2016),
who showed that if the underlying network is acyclic, stable outcomes are guaranteed to
exist and some of the problems known to be computationally hard for the unrestricted
setting become polynomial-time solvable. We obtain a similar result for GASP, but only if
several groups of agents can simultaneously engage in the same activity, i.e., if the activities
are copyable. In contrast, we show that if each activity can be assigned to at most one
coalition, a stable outcome may fail to exist, and moreover finding them is computationally
hard even if the underlying network is very simple. Specifically, checking the existence of
Nash stable, individually stable, or core stable outcomes turns out to be NP-hard even
for very restricted classes of graphs, including paths, stars, and graphs with constant-size
connected components. This result stands in sharp contrast to the known computational
results in the literature; indeed, in the context of of cooperative games, such restricted
networks usually enable one to design efficient algorithms for computing stable solutions
(see, e.g., Chalkiadakis et al. (2016); Elkind (2014); Igarashi and Elkind (2016)).
Given these hardness results, we switch to the fixed parameter tractability paradigm.
A problem is said to be fixed parameter tractable (FPT) with respect to a parameter k if
each instance I of this problem can be solved in time f(k)poly(|I|), and to be slice-wise
polynomial (XP) with respect to a parameter k if each instance I of this problem can be
solved in time |I|f(k), respectively; here f is a computable function that depends only on
k. In the context of GASP, a particularly relevant parameter is the number of activities:
generally speaking, we expect the number of available activities to be small in many practical
applications. For instance, companies can only assign a limited number of projects to their
employers; a workshop can usually organise a couple of social events; and schools can offer
few facilities to their students. We show that the problem of deciding the existence of Nash
stable outcomes for gGASPs on acyclic graphs is in FPT with respect to the number of
activities. For general graphs, we obtain a W[1]-hardness result, implying that this problem
is unlikely to admit an FPT algorithm. This hardness result holds even for gGASPs on
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general case few activities (p) few players (n) copyable activities
Nash stability and individual stability
cliques NP-c. W[1]-h. (Th. 23, 25) W[1]-h. (Th. 31) NP-c.
acyclic NP-c. (Th. 10, 13) FPT (Th. 16,18) XP (Obs. 29) P (Th. 9, 8)
paths NP-c. (Th. 10, 13) FPT (Th. 16,18) XP (Obs. 29) P (Th. 9, 8)
stars NP-c. (Th. 11, 13) FPT (Th. 16,18) XP (Obs. 29) P (Th. 9, 8)
small comp. NP-c. (Th. 12, 13) FPT (Th. 14) XP P (Th. 9, 8)
core stability
cliques NP-c. NP-c. for p = 4 (Th. 28) W[1]-h. (Th. 30) NP-c.
acyclic NP-c. (Th. 13) NP-c. for p = 2 (Th. 19) XP (Obs. 29) P
paths NP-c. (Th. 13) XP (Prop. 21) XP (Obs. 29) P
stars NP-c. (Th. 13) NP-c. for p = 2 (Th. 19) XP (Obs. 29) P
small comp. NP-c. (Th. 13) FPT (Th. 15) XP (Obs. 29) P
Table 1: Overview of our complexity results. All W[1]-hardness results are accompanied by XP-
membership proofs. For all ‘XP’-entries, the question whether the problem is fixed-parameter
tractable remains open. Grey entries are results that have appeared in the literature before.
cliques; thus, it is also W[1]-hard to decide the existence of a Nash stable outcome in a
standard GASP.
While we find that from an algorithmic point of view, individual stability is very similar
to Nash stability, unfortunately, our FPT results do not extend to core stability: we prove
that checking the existence of core stable assignments is NP-complete even for gGASPs on
stars with two activities; for standard GASP, we can prove that this problem is hard if there
are at least four activities. On the other hand, if there is only one activity, a core stable
assignment always exists and can be constructed efficiently, for any network structure.
Another parameter we consider is the number of players. This restriction applies to many
practical scenarios. For example, in research teams with limited human resources, there are
a limited number of researchers who are able to conduct the projects. Somewhat surprisingly,
we show that the parameterization by the number of players does not give rise to an FPT
algorithm for gGASPs on general networks. Specifically, for all stability notions we consider,
it is W[1]-hard to decide the existence of a stable outcome even when the underlying graph
is a clique. Again, our hardness result particularly implies the W[1]-hardness of computing
stable outcomes in a standard GASP. We summarize our complexity results in Table 1.
1.1 Related work
Darmann et al. (2012) initiate the study of GASP. In the work of Darmann et al. (2012),
players are assumed to have approval preferences, and a particular focus is placed on
individually rational assignments with the maximum number of participants and Nash stable
assignments. They obtained a number of complexity results of computing these outcomes
while concerning special cases where players have increasing/degreasing preferences on the
size of a group. Subsequently, Darmann (2015) investigated a model where players submit
ranked ballots. In this work, stability concepts such as core stability and individual stability
have been adapted from the hedonic games literature. Further, Lee and Shoham (2015)
studied stable invitation problems, which is a subclass of GASP where only one activity is
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assigned to players. This problem was inspired by settings in which an organizer of an event
chooses a stable set of guests who have preferences over the number of participants of the
event. We refer the reader to the recent survey by Darmann and Lang (2017) for the relation
between these models.
Recently, the parameterized aspects of GASP have been considered by several authors.
Lee and Williams (2017) studied the complexity of standard GASP, with parameter being
the number of groups. They showed that computing a maximum individually rational
assignment is in FPT with respect to that parameter; however, they proved that this does
not extend to other solution concepts, such as Nash stability and envy-freeness, by obtaining
a number of W[1]-hardness results. More recently, Gupta et al. (2017) investigated the
parameterized complexity of finding Nash stable outcomes in the context of gGASP. In
their work, computation of a Nash stable outcome was shown to be in FPT with respect
to the combined parameters: the maximum size of a group and the maximum degree in
the underlying social network. They also presented an FPT algorithm with respect to the
number of activities when the underlying network has a bounded tree-width. This generalizes
our FPT result for trees and improves the bound on the running time.
GASP are closely related to hedonic games (Banerjee et al., 2001; Bogomolnaia & Jackson,
2002). Much work has been devoted to the complexity study of hedonic games when there is
no restriction on coalition formation (see e.g. Woeginger (2013) and Aziz and Savani (2016)).
In particular, the copyable setting of GASP includes a class of anonymous hedonic games
where players’ preferences are only determined by the size of the coalition to which they
belong. Ballester (2004) showed that computing Nash, core, and individually stable outcomes
of the game is NP-hard for anonymous games; this translates into the NP-hardness of these
solutions for copyable instances of gGASP when the social network is a clique. Nevertheless,
our positive results for copyable activities imply that in anonymous hedonic games, one can
compute a stable outcome in polynomial time if the underlying social network is acyclic.
It is worth mentioning that models with graph connectivity constraints have been studied
in different settings from ours (Talmon, 2017; Bouveret et al., 2017; Suksompong, 2017).
Talmon (2017) considered the multiwinner problem when each winner has to represent a
connected voting district. In the work of Talmon (2017), a similar hardness result concerning
optimal committees for paths was obtained; further, computing an optimal committee on
graphs with bounded tree-width was shown to be polynomial-time solvable for non-unique
variants of the problem where several connected districts can be represented by the same
winner. This restriction corresponds to our copyalbe cases of gGASP. In the fair division
literature, Bouveret et al. (2017) investigated a fair allocation of indivisible goods under
graph connectivity constraints: the graph represents the dependency among the items, and
each player’s bundle must be connected in this graph. Similarly, computing envy-free and
proportional allocations was proven to be NP-hard even when the graph among the items
is a path; however, they showed that computing maximin fair allocations can be done in
polynomial time when the graph is acyclic.
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2. Preliminaries
2.1 Group Activity Selection Problems
For s ∈ N, let [s] = {1, 2, . . . , s}. For s, t ∈ Z where s ≤ t, let [s, t] = {s, s+ 1, s+ 2, . . . , t}.
An instance of the Group Activity Selection Problem (GASP) is given by a finite set of players
N = [n], a finite set of activities A = A∗ ∪ {a∅}, where A∗ = {a1, a2, . . . , ap} and a∅ is the
void activity, and a profile (i)i∈N of complete and transitive preference relations over the
set of alternatives (A∗ × [n]) ∪ {(a∅, 1)}. Intuitively, a∅ corresponds to staying alone and
doing nothing; multiple agents can make that choice independently from each other.
Throughout the paper, we assume that we can determine in unit time whether each
player i prefers (a, k) to (b, `), prefers (b, `) to (a, k), or is indifferent between them. We will
write x i y or i : x  y to indicate that player i strictly prefers alternative x to alternative
y; similarly, we will write x ∼i y or i : x ∼ y if i is indifferent between x and y. Also,
given two sets of alternatives X,Y and a player i, we write X i Y to indicate that i is
indifferent among all alternatives in X as well as among all alternatives in Y , and prefers
each alternative in X to each alternative in Y .
We refer to subsets S ⊆ N of players as coalitions. We say that two non-void activities a
and b are equivalent if for every player i ∈ N and every ` ∈ [n] it holds that (a, `) ∼i (b, `).
A non-void activity a ∈ A∗ is called copyable if A∗ contains at least n activities that are
equivalent to a (including a itself). We say that player i ∈ N approves an alternative (a, k)
if (a, k) i (a∅, 1).
An outcome of a GASP is an assignment of activities A to players N , i.e., a mapping
pi : N → A. Given an assignment pi : N → A and a non-void activity a ∈ A∗, we denote by
pia = { i ∈ N | pi(i) = a } the set of players assigned to a. Also, if pi(i) 6= a∅, we denote by
pii = {i} ∪ { j ∈ N | pi(j) = pi(i)} the set of players assigned to the same activity as player
i ∈ N ; we set pii = {i} if pi(i) = a∅. An assignment pi : N → A for a GASP is individually
rational (IR) if for every player i ∈ N with pi(i) 6= a∅ we have (pi(i), |pii|) i (a∅, 1). A
coalition S ⊆ N and an activity a ∈ A∗ strongly block an assignment pi : N → A if pia ⊆ S
and (a, |S|) i (pi(i), |pii|) for all i ∈ S. An assignment pi : N → A for a GASP is called core
stable (CR) if it is individually rational, and there is no coalition S ⊆ N and activity a ∈ A∗
such that S and a strongly block pi. Given an assignment pi : N → A of a gGASP, a player
i ∈ N is said to have
• an NS-deviation to activity a ∈ A∗ if i strictly prefers to join the group pia, i.e.,
(a, |pia|+ 1) i (pi(i), |pii|).
• an IS-deviation if it is an NS-deviation, and all players in pia accept it, i.e., (a, |pia|+1) j
(a, |pia|) for all j ∈ pia.
2.2 Graphs and digraphs
An undirected graph, or simply a graph, is a pair (N,L), where N is a finite set of nodes and
L ⊆ {{i, j} | i, j ∈ N, i 6= j } is a collection of edges between nodes. Given a set of nodes S,
the subgraph of (N,L) induced by S is the graph (S,L|S), where L|S = {{i, j} ∈ L | i, j ∈ S}.
For a graph (N,L), a sequence of distinct nodes (i1, i2, . . . , ik), k ≥ 2, is called a path in
L if {ih, ih+1} ∈ L for h ∈ [k − 1]. A path (i1, i2, . . . , ik), k ≥ 3, is said to be a cycle in L
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if {ik, i1} ∈ L. A graph (N,L) is said to be a forest if it contains no cycles. An edge e is
incident to a node i if i ∈ e. A pair of distinct nodes i, j are adjacent if {i, j} ∈ L. A subset
S ⊆ N is said to be connected in (N,L) if for every pair of distinct nodes i, j ∈ S there is a
path between i and j in L|S. A forest (N,L) is said to be a tree if N is connected in (N,L).
A tree (N,L) is called a star if there exists a central node c ∈ N that is adjacent to every
other node. A subset S ⊆ N of a graph (N,L) is said to be a clique if for every pair of
distinct nodes i, j ∈ S, i and j are adjacent.
A directed graph, or a digraph, is a pair (N,T ) where N is a finite set of nodes and
T ⊆ N ×N is a collection of arcs between nodes. A sequence of distinct nodes (i1, i2, . . . , ik),
k ≥ 2, is called a directed path in T if (ih, ih+1) ∈ T for h = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1. Given a digraph
(N,T ), let L(T ) = { {i, j} | (i, j) ∈ T }: the graph (N,L(T )) is the undirected version of
(N,T ). A digraph (N,T ) is said to be a rooted tree if (N,L(T )) is a tree and each node has
at most one arc entering it. A rooted tree has exactly one node that no arc enters, called
the root, and there exists a unique directed path from the root to every node of N . Let
(N,T ) be a rooted tree. A node i ∈ N is said to be a child of j in T if (j, i) ∈ T , and to
be the parent of j in T if (i, j) ∈ T . A node i ∈ N is called a descendant of j in T if there
exists a directed path from j to i in T ; here, j is called a predecessor of i.
3. Our Model
We now define a group activity selection problem where communication links between the
players are represented by an undirected graph.
Definition 1. An instance of the Group Activity Selection Problem with graph structure
(gGASP) is given by an instance (N, (i)i∈N , A) of a GASP and a set of communication links
between players L ⊆ {{i, j} | i, j ∈ N ∧ i 6= j }.
A coalition S ⊆ N is said to be feasible if S is connected in the graph (N,L). An outcome
of a gGASP is a feasible assignment pi : N → A such that pii is a feasible coalition for every
i ∈ N . We adapt the definitions of stability concepts to our setting as follows. We say
that a deviation by a group of players is feasible if the deviating coalition itself is feasible;
a deviation by an individual player where player i joins activity a is feasible if pia ∪ {i} is
feasible. We modify the definitions in the previous section by only requiring stability against
feasible deviations. Note that an ordinary GASP (without graph structure) is equivalent to
a gGASP where the underlying graph (N,L) is complete.
A key feature of gGASP as well as GASP is that players’ preferences are anonymous,
i.e., players do not care about the identities of the group members. We can thus show
that checking whether a given feasible assignment is core stable is easy, irrespective of the
structure of the social network. The proposition below generalizes Theorem 11 of Darmann
(2015). Note that in many other contexts, deciding whether a given assignment is core stable
is coNP-hard, for example in additively separable hedonic games (Sung & Dimitrov, 2007).
Proposition 2. Given an instance (N, (i))i∈N , A, L) of gGASP and a feasible assignment
pi for that instance, we can decide in O(pn3) time whether pi is core stable.
Proof. Let A = A∗ ∪ {a∅} and let n = |N |. By scanning the assignment pi and the players’
preferences, we can check whether pi is individually rational. Now, suppose that this is
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the case. Then, for each a ∈ A∗ and each s ∈ [n] we can check if there is a deviation by
a connected coalition of size s that engages in a. To this end, we consider the set Sa,s of
all players who strictly prefer (a, s) to their assignment under pi and verify whether Sa,s
has a connected component of size at least s that contains pia; if this is the case, pia (which
is itself connected or empty) could be extended to a connected coalition of size exactly s
that strongly blocks pi. If no such deviation exists, pi is core stable. The existence of a
connected component of a given size can be checked in O(n2) time by using depth first
search algorithm.
In this paper, we will be especially interested in gGASPs where (N,L) is acyclic. This
restriction guarantees the existence of stable outcomes in many other cooperative game
settings (Demange, 2004). However, this is not the case for gGASP: here, all stable outcomes
under consideration may fail to exist, even if (N,L) is a path or a star.
Example 3 (Stalker game). Consider a gGASP with N = {1, 2}, A∗ = {a}, L = {{1, 2}},
where preferences (i)i∈N are given as follows:
1 : (a, 1)  (a∅, 1)
2 : (a, 2)  (a∅, 1)
Thus, player 1 wishes to participate in activity a alone, while player 2 (the “stalker”) wants
to participate in activity a together with player 1.
This instance admits no Nash stable outcomes: If all players engage in the void activity,
player 1 wants to start doing activity a. If player 1 does activity a, then player 2 wants to
join her coalition, causing player 1 to deviate to the void activity.
Similarly, a core stable outcome is not guaranteed to exist even for gGASPs on paths
and stars, as the following example shows.
Example 4. Consider a gGASP with N = {1, 2, 3}, A∗ = {a, b}, L = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}}, where
preferences (i)i∈N are given as follows:
1 : (b, 2)  (a, 3)  (a∅, 1)
2 : (a, 2)  (b, 2)  (a, 3)  (a∅, 1)
3 : (a, 3)  (b, 1)  (a, 2)  (a∅, 1)
We will argue that each individually rational feasible assignment pi admits a strongly blocking
feasible coalition and activity. If all players do nothing, then player 3 and activity b strongly
block pi. Now, there are only four individually rational feasible assignments where some
player is engaged in a non-void activity; each of them is strongly blocked by some coalition
and activity as follows (we write S → x to indicate that coalition S strongly blocks pi
together with activity x):
(1) pi(1) = b, pi(2) = b, pi(3) = a∅: {2, 3} → a;
(2) pi(1) = a∅, pi(2) = a, pi(3) = a: {3} → b;
(3) pi(1) = a∅, pi(2) = a∅, pi(3) = b: {1, 2, 3} → a;
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(4) pi(1) = a, pi(2) = a, pi(3) = a: {1, 2} → b;
Igarashi and Elkind (2016) showed that in the context of hedonic games, acyclicity is
sufficient for individually stable outcomes to exist: an individually stable partition of players
always exists and can be computed in polynomial time. In contrast, it turns out that for
gGASPs this is not the case: an individually stable outcome may fail to exist even if the
underlying social network is a path; moreover, this may happen even if there are only three
players and their preferences are strict.
Example 5. Consider a gGASP with N = {1, 2, 3}, A∗ = {a, b, c}, L = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}},
where players’ preferences are as follows:
1 : (b, 2)  (a, 1)  (c, 3)  (c, 2)  (c, 1)  (a∅, 1)
2 : (c, 3)  (c, 2)  (a, 2)  (b, 2)  (b, 1)  (a∅, 1)
3 : (c, 3)  (a, 2)  (a, 1)  (a∅, 1)
We will argue that each individually rational feasible assignment pi admits an IS-deviation.
Indeed, if pi(1) = a∅ then no player is engaged in c and hence player 1 can deviate to c.
Similarly, if pi(2) = a∅ then no player is engaged in b and hence player 2 can deviate to b.
There are 9 individually rational feasible assignments where pi(1) 6= a∅, pi(2) 6= a∅; for each
of them we can find an IS deviation as follows (we write i→ x to indicate that player i has
an IS-deviation to activity x):
(1) pi(1) = a, pi(2) = b, pi(3) = a∅: 1→ b;
(2) pi(1) = b, pi(2) = b, pi(3) = a∅: 3→ a;
(3) pi(1) = b, pi(2) = b, pi(3) = a: 2→ a;
(4) pi(1) = c, pi(2) = a, pi(3) = a: 2→ c;
(5) pi(1) = c, pi(2) = b, pi(3) = a∅: 3→ a;
(6) pi(1) = c, pi(2) = b, pi(3) = a: 2→ a;
(7) pi(1) = c, pi(2) = c, pi(3) = a∅: 3→ a;
(8) pi(1) = c, pi(2) = c, pi(3) = a: 3→ c;
(9) pi(1) = c, pi(2) = c, pi(3) = c: 1→ a.
Notice that the instance does not admit a core stable outcome either: if such an outcome
existed, the assignment would satisfy individual stability due to the fact that all the
preferences are strict, a contradiction to what we have seen above.
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3.1 Copyable cases
If all activities are copyable, we can effectively treat gGASP as a non-transferable utility
game on a graph. In particular, we can invoke a famous result of Demange (2004) concerning
the stability of non-transferable utility games on trees. Thus, requiring all activities to be
copyable allows us to circumvent the non-existence result for the core (Example 4). The
argument is constructive.
Theorem 6 (implicit in the work of Demange (2004)). For every gGASP where each activity
a ∈ A∗ is copyable and (N,L) is acyclic, a core stable feasible assignment exists and can be
found in time polynomial in p and n.
Proof. If the input graph (N,L) is a forest, we can process each of its connected components
separately, so we assume that (N,L) is a tree. Prior to giving a formal description of
the algorithm (Algorithm 1), we outline the basic idea. We choose an arbitrary node r
as the root and construct a rooted tree (N,T ) by orienting the edges in L towards the
leaves. We denote by ch(i) the set of children of i and by desc(i) the set of descendants
of i (including i) in the rooted tree. For each i ∈ N , we define height(i) = 0 if ch(i) = ∅,
and height(i) = 1 + max{ height(j) | j ∈ ch(i) } otherwise. We denote by (N,T |S) the
subdigraph induced by S ⊆ N , i.e., T |S = { (i, j) ∈ T | i, j ∈ S }. We define C(i) to be the
set of connected subsets of desc(i) for each i ∈ N .
The algorithm has two different phases: the bottom-up and the top-down phase.
• Bottom-up phase: In the bottom-up phase, we will determine a guaranteed activity
a(i) and coalition S(i) for every subroot i. To this end, we choose a connected subset
S(i) of desc(i) that maximizes i’s utility under the constraint that every descendant j
of i in the coalition can agree, i.e., for any descendant j ∈ S(i) of i, (a(i), |S(i)|) is
at least as preferred as (a(j), |S(j)|). The utility level of (a(i), |S(i)|) determined for
each player i ∈ N can be interpreted as i’s guaranteed utility in the final outcome.
• Top-down phase: In the top-down phase, the algorithm builds a feasible assignment
pi, by iteratively choosing a root r′ of the remaining rooted trees and reassigning the
activity a(r′) to its coalition S(r′). Since each activity is copyable, we can always find
an activity that is equivalent to a(r′) and has not been used by their predecessors.
This procedure is formalized in Algorithm 1.
We will now argue that Algorithm 1 correctly finds a core stable feasible assignment.
Observe that the following lemma holds due to the if statement in line 7 of the algorithm.
Lemma 7. For all i ∈ N , the following statements hold:
(i) i has no incentive to deviate to an alternative of size 1, i.e., (a(i), |S(i)|) i (b, 1) for
all b ∈ A,
(ii) all players in S(i) weakly prefer (a(i), |S(i)|) to their guaranteed alternative (a(j), |S(j)|).
Now, by (ii) in Lemma 7, it can be easily verified that
(pi(i), |pii|) i (a(i), |S(i)|) for all i ∈ N. (1)
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Algorithm 1: Finding core stable partitions
input : tree (N,L), activity set A = A∗ ∪ {a∅}, r ∈ N , preference i, i ∈ N
output : pi : N → A
1 // Bottom-up phase: assign activities to players in a bottom-up
manner;
2 make a rooted tree (N,T ) with root r by orienting all the edges in L;
3 initialize S(i)← {i} and a(i)← a∅ for each i ∈ N ;
4 foreach t = 0, . . . ,height(r) do
5 foreach i ∈ N with height(i) = t do
6 // Find i’s favourite alternative where all members of i’s
coalition can agree to join. foreach (a, k) ∈ (A∗ × [n]) ∪ {(a∅, 1)} do
7 if there exists S ∈ C(i) such that |S| = k, (a, k) j (a(j), |S(j)|) for all
j ∈ S, and (a, k)  (a(i), |S(i)|) then
8 set S(i)← S and a(i)← a;
9 // Top-down phase: relabel players with their predecessor’s
activities;
10 set N ′ ← N and A′ ← A∗;
11 while N ′ 6= ∅ do
12 choose a root r′ of some connected component of the digraph (N ′, T |N ′) and find
an activity b ∈ A′ ∪ {a∅} that is equivalent to a(r′);
13 set pi(i)← b for all i ∈ S(r′);
14 set N ′ ← N ′ \ S(r′) and A′ ← A′ \ {b};
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Combining this with (i), we know that at the assignment pi, all players weakly prefer their
alternatives to engaging alone in unused activities or the void activity. It thus remains to
show that no connected coalition together with a non-void activity strongly blocks pi.
Take any connected subset S ⊆ N and activity a ∈ A∗. Let i be the subroot of the
coalition S so that S ∈ C(i). First, consider the case when (a(i), |S(i)|) i (a, |S|). By (1),
it is clear that the coalition S and the activity a do not strongly block pi. Second, consider
the case when (a, |S|) i (a(i), |S(i)|). By line 7 of the algorithm, this means that there is a
player j ∈ S such that (a(j), |S(j)|) j (a, |S|). Thus, S and a do not strongly block pi. We
conclude that pi is core stable.
It remains to analyze the running time of Algorithm 1. Consider the execution of the
algorithm for a fixed player i. Let d = |desc(i)|. Line 7 checks whether there is a connected
coalition of size k that can engage in a. Similarly to the proof of Proposition 2, we do
this by computing the set S of all descendants in desc(i) \ {i} who weakly prefer (a, k) to
their guaranteed coalition and verify whether the set S ∪ {i} has a connected component
of size at least k. This procedure requires at most d queries: no descendant of i is queried
more than once. Summing over all players, we conclude that the number of queries for the
bottom-up phase is bounded by O(n3p). It is immediate that the top-down phase can be
done in polynomial time. This completes the proof of the theorem.
Similarly, an individually stable outcome is guaranteed to exist in copyable cases if the
underlying graph is acyclic. Moreover, we can adapt the result of Igarashi and Elkind (2016)
for hedonic games and obtain an efficient algorithm for computing an individually stable
outcome. The proof can be found in the appendix.
Theorem 8. Each instance of gGASP where each activity a ∈ A∗ is copyable and (N,L) is
acyclic admits an individually stable feasible assignment; moreover, such an assignment can
be found in time polynomial in p and n.
The stalker game in Example 3 does not admit a Nash stable outcome even if we make
all activities copyable. Thus, in contrast to core and individual stability, there is no existence
guarantee for Nash stability even if activities are copyable. However, with copyable activities,
we can still check for the existence of a Nash stable outcome in polynomial time if the social
network is acyclic.
Theorem 9. Given an instance (N,A, (i)i∈N , L) of gGASP where each activity a ∈ A∗ is
copyable and the graph (N,L) is acyclic, one can decide whether it admits a Nash stable
outcome in time polynomial in p and n.
Proof. Again, we assume that (N,L) is a tree. We choose an arbitrary node as the root
and construct a rooted tree by orienting the edges in L towards the leaves. We denote by
ch(i) = {j1, j2, . . . , j|ch(i)|} the set of children of i; and we denote by desc(i, c) the set of
the descendants of the first c-th children of i (including j1, j2, . . . , jc) in the rooted tree.
Then, for each player i ∈ N , each c ∈ [|ch(i)|], each alternative (a, k) ∈ X, and t ∈ [k]
we set NS[i, c, (a, k), t] to true if there exists a feasible assignment pi : N → A such that
|pii ∩ (desc(i, c) ∪ {i})| = t, pi(i) = a, each player in pii ∩ (desc(i, c) ∪ {i}) likes (a, k) at
least as much as any alternative she can deviate to (including the void activity), and no
player in desc(i, c) \ pii has an NS feasible deviation. Otherwise, we set NS[i, c, (a, k), t]
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to false. By construction, there exists a Nash stable feasible assignment if and only if
NS[r, |ch(r)|, (a, k), k] is true for some alternative (a, k) ∈ X, where r is the root of the
rooted tree.
For each player i ∈ N , each c ∈ [|ch(i)|], each alternative (a, k) ∈ X, and each t ∈ [k],
we initialize NS[i, c, (a, k), t] to true if t = 1 and i weakly prefers (a, k) to any alternative of
size 1, and we set NS[i, c, (a, k), t] to false otherwise. Then, for i ∈ N from the bottom to
the root, we iterate through all the children jc of i and update NS[i, c, (a, k), t] step-by-step;
more precisely, for each child jc of i and for t ∈ [k], we set NS[i, c, (a, k), t] to true if
• t ≥ 2 and there exists an x ∈ [t − 1] such that both NS[i, c − 1, (a, k), t − x] and
NS[j, c, (a, k), x] are true, or
• NS[i, c − 1, (a, k), t] is true, and players i and jc can be separated from each other,
i.e., there exists (b, `) ∈ X such that (i) NS[jc, |ch(j)|, (b, `), `] is true, (ii) b = a∅ or
(a, k) i (b, `+ 1), and (iii) a = a∅ or (b, `) j (a, k + 1).
In cases where NS[r, |ch(r)|, (a, k), k] is true for some alternative (a, k) ∈ X, a Nash stable
feasible assignment can be found using dynamic programming.
This can be done in polynomial time since the size of the dynamic programming table is
at most n3p and each entry can be filled in time O(n2p). This completes the proof of the
theorem.
We note that these tractability results for copyable cases do not extend to arbitrary
graphs: Ballester (2004) showed that it is NP-complete to determine the existence of core or
individually or Nash stable outcomes for anonymous hedonic games, which can be considered
as a subclass of gGASPs whose graph is a clique.
4. NP-completeness results
We now move on to the case where each activity can be used at most once. For other types
of cooperative games, many desirable outcomes can be computed in polynomial time if the
underlying network structure is simple (Chalkiadakis et al., 2016; Elkind, 2014; Igarashi
& Elkind, 2016). In particular, Igarashi and Elkind (2016) showed it is easy to compute
stable partitions for hedonic games on trees with polynomially bounded number of connected
coalitions. However, computing stable solutions of gGASP turns out to be NP-complete
even if the underlying network is a path, a star, or a graph with constant-size connected
components. For each family of graphs, we will reduce from a different combinatorial problem
that is structurally similar to our problem.
Paths. Our proof for paths is by reduction from a restricted version of the NP-complete
problem Rainbow Matching. Given a graph G and a set of colors C, a proper edge coloring
is a mapping φ : E → C where φ(e) 6= φ(e′) for all edges e, e′ such that e 6= e′ and e ∩ e′ 6= ∅.
Without loss of generality, we assume that φ is surjective. A properly edge-colored graph
(G, C, φ) is a graph together with a set of colors and a proper edge coloring. A matching
M in an edge-colored graph (G, C, φ) is called a rainbow matching if all edges of M have
different colors. Given a properly edge-colored graph (G, C, φ) together with an integer k,
Rainbow Matching asks whether G admits a rainbow matching with at least k edges. Le
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and Pfender (2014) show that Rainbow Matching remains NP-complete even for properly
edge-colored paths.
Theorem 10. Given an instance of gGASP whose underlying graph is a path, it is NP-
complete to determine whether it has a Nash stable feasible assignment.
Proof. Clearly, our problems are contained in NP since we can easily check whether a given
assignment is Nash stable. The hardness proof proceeds by a reduction from Path Rainbow
Matching.
Construction. Given an instance (G, C, φ, k) of Path Rainbow Matching where |C| = q,
we create a vertex player v for each v ∈ V and an edge player e for each e ∈ E. To create the
social network, we start with G and place each edge player in the middle of the respective
edge, i.e., we let NG = V ∪ E and LG = { {v, e} | v ∈ e ∈ E }. To the right of the graph
(NG, LG), we attach a path consisting of “garbage collectors” {g1, g2, . . . , gq−k} and q copies
(Nc, Lc) of the stalker game where Nc = {c1, c2} and Lc = {{c1, c2}} for each c ∈ C. See
Figure 1.
u e v gi Nc
Figure 1: The graph constructed in the hardness proof for gGASPs on paths.
We introduce a color activity c for each color c ∈ C. Each vertex player v approves color
activities φ(e) of its adjacent edges e with size 3; each edge player e approves the color
activity φ(e) of its color with size 3; each garbage collector gi approves any color activity c
with size 1; finally, for players in Nc, c ∈ C, player c1 approves its color activity c with size
1, whereas player c2 approves c with size 2.
Correctness. We show that G has a rainbow matching of size at least k if and only if
there exists a Nash stable feasible assignment.
Suppose that there exists a rainbow matching M of size k. We construct a feasible
assignment pi where for each e = {u, v} ∈M we set pi(e) = pi(u) = pi(v) = φ(e), each garbage
collector gi, i ∈ [q − k], is arbitrarily assigned to one of the remaining q − k color activities,
and the remaining players are assigned to the void activity. The assignment pi is Nash
stable, since every garbage collector as well as every edge or vertex player assigned to a
color activity are allocated their top alternative, and no remaining player has an NS feasible
deviation.
Conversely, suppose that there is a Nash stable feasible assignment pi. Let M = { e ∈
E(G) | pi(e) ∈ C }. We will show that M is a rainbow matching of size at least k. To see this,
notice that pi cannot allocate a color activity to a member of Nc, since otherwise no feasible
assignment would be Nash stable. Further, at most q − k color activities are allocated to
the garbage collectors, which means that at least k color activities should be assigned to
vertex and edge players. The only individually rational way to do this is to select triples
of the form (u, e, v) where e = {u, v} ∈ E(G) and assign to them their color activity φ(e).
Thus, M is a rainbow matching of size at least k.
Stars. For gGASPs on stars we provide a reduction from the NP-complete problem
Minimum Maximal Matching (MMM). Given a graph G and a positive integer k ≤ |E|,
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MMM asks whether G admits a maximal matching with at most k edges. The problem
remains NP-complete for bipartite graphs (Demange & Ekim, 2008).
Theorem 11. Given an instance of gGASP whose underlying graph is a star, it is NP-
complete to determine whether it has a Nash stable feasible assignment.
Proof. Clearly, our problem is in NP. To prove NP-hardness, we reduce from MMM on
bipartite graphs.
Construction. Given a bipartite graph G = (U ∪ V,E) with vertex bipartition (U, V )
and an integer k, we create a star with center c and |V |+ 1 leaves: one leaf for each vertex
player v ∈ V plus one stalker s. See Figure 2.
c
s
v1
v2
v3
vn
Figure 2: The graph constructed in the hardness proof for gGASPs on stars.
We introduce an activity u for each u ∈ U , and two additional activities a and b. A
player v ∈ V approves (u, 1) for each activity u such that {u, v} ∈ E as well as (a, |V |−k+1)
and prefers the former to the latter. That is, (u, 1) v (a, |V | − k + 1) for every u ∈ U with
{u, v} ∈ E; v is indifferent among the activities associated with its neighbors in the graph,
that is, (u, 1) ∼v (u′, 1) for all u, u′ ∈ U such that {u, v} ∈ E and {u′, v} ∈ E. The center
player c approves both (a, |V | − k + 1) and (b, 1), and prefers the former to the latter, i.e.,
(a, |V | − k + 1) c (b, 1) c (a∅, 1). Finally, the stalker s only approves (b, 2).
Correctness. We now show that G admits a maximal matching M with at most k edges
if and only if our instance of gGASP admits a Nash stable assignment.
Suppose that G admits a maximal matching M with at most k edges. We construct
a feasible assignment pi by setting pi(v) = u for each {u, v} ∈ M , assigning |V | − k vertex
players and the center to a, and assigning the remaining players to the void activity. Clearly,
the center c has no incentive to deviate and no vertex player in a singleton coalition wants
to deviate to the coalition of the center. Further, no vertex v has an NS-deviation to an
unused activity u, since if pi admits such a deviation, this would mean that M ∪{u, v} forms
a matching, contradicting maximality of M . Finally, the stalker player does not deviate
since the center does not engage in b. Hence, pi is Nash stable.
Conversely, suppose that there exists a Nash stable feasible assignment pi and let
M = { {pi(v), v} | v ∈ V ∧ pi(v) ∈ U }. We will show that M is a maximal matching of size
at most k. By Nash stability, the stalker player should not have an incentive to deviate, and
hence the center player and |V | − k vertex players are assigned to activity a. It follows that
k vertex players are not assigned to a, and therefore |M | ≤ k. Moreover, M is a matching
since each vertex player is assigned to at most one activity, and by individual rationality each
activity can be assigned to at most one player. Now suppose towards a contradiction that
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M is not maximal, i.e., there exists an edge {u, v} ∈ E such that M ∪ {u, v} is a matching.
This would mean that in pi no player is assigned to u, and v is assigned to the void activity;
hence, v has an NS-deviation to u, contradicting the Nash stability of pi.
Small components. In the analysis of cooperative games on social networks one can
usually assume that the social network is connected: if this is not the case, each connected
component can be processed separately. This is also the case for gGASP as long as all
activities are copyable. However, if each activity can only be used by a single group, different
connected components are no longer independent, as they have to choose from the same
pool of activities. Indeed, we will now show that the problem of finding stable outcomes
remains NP-hard even if the size of each connected component is at most four. Our hardness
proof for this problem proceeds by reduction from a restricted version of 3Sat. Specifically,
we consider (3,B2)-Sat: in this version of 3Sat each clause contains exactly 3 literals, and
each variable occurs exactly twice positively and twice negatively. This problem is known to
be NP-complete (Berman et al., 2003).
Theorem 12. Given an instance of gGASP whose underlying graph has connected compo-
nents whose size is bounded by 4, it is NP-complete to determine whether it has a Nash
stable feasible assignment.
Proof. Our problem is in NP. We reduce from (3,B2)-Sat.
Construction. Consider a formula φ with variable set X and clause set C, where for each
variable x ∈ X we write x1 and x2 for the two positive occurrences of x, and x¯1 and x¯2 for the
two negative occurrences of x. For each x ∈ X, we introduce four players p1(x), p2(x), p¯1(x),
and p¯2(x). For each clause c ∈ C, we introduce one stalker sc and three other players c1, c2,
and c3. The network (N,L) consists of one component for each clause—a star with center
sc and leaves c1, c2, and c3—and of two components for each variable x ∈ X consisting of
a single edge each: {p1(x), p2(x)} and {p¯1(x), p¯2(x)}. See Figure 3. Thus, the size of each
component of this graph is at most 4.
sc
c1
c2
c3
p1(x) p2(x) p¯1(x) p¯2(x)
Figure 3: The graph used in the hardness proof for gGASPs on graphs with small components.
For each x ∈ X we introduce one variable activity x, two positive literal activities x1 and
x2, and two negative literal activities x¯1 and x¯2, which correspond to the four occurrences of
x; also, we introduce two further activities a(x) and a¯(x). Finally, we introduce an activity
c for each clause c ∈ C. Thus,
A∗ =
⋃
x∈X
{x, x1, x2, x¯1, x¯2, a(x), a¯(x)} ∪ C.
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For each x ∈ X the preferences of the positive literal players p1(x) and p2(x) are given as
follows:
p1(x): (x, 2)  (x, 1)  (x1, 1)  (x2, 2)  (a(x), 1)  (a∅, 1),
p2(x): (x, 2)  (x2, 1)  (x1, 2)  (a(x), 2)  (a∅, 1).
If one of the positive literal players p1(x) and p2(x) is engaged in the void activity and the
other is engaged alone in a non-void activity, this would cause the former player to deviate
to another activity; thus, in a Nash stable assignment, none of the activities a(x) and a∅
can be assigned to positive literal players. Similarly, for each x ∈ X the preferences of the
negative literal players p¯1(x) and p¯2(x) are given as follows:
p¯1(x): (x, 2)  (x, 1)  (x¯1, 1)  (x¯2, 2)  (a¯(x), 1)  (a∅, 1),
p¯2(x): (x, 2)  (x¯2, 1)  (x¯1, 2)  (a¯(x), 2)  (a∅, 1).
As argued above, Nash stable assignments cannot allocate activities a¯(x) and a∅ to negative
literal players. Hence, if there exists a Nash stable assignment, there are only two possible
cases:
• both players p1(x) and p2(x) are assigned to x, and players p¯1(x) and p¯2(x) are assigned
to x¯1 and x¯2, respectively;
• both players p¯1(x) and p¯2(x) are assigned to x, and players p1(x) and p2(x) are assigned
to x1 and x2, respectively.
For players in Nc where `
c
1, `
c
2, and `
c
3 are the literals in a clause c, the preferences are
given by
cr : (`
c
r, 1)  (c, 2)  (a∅, 1), (r = 1, 2, 3)
sc : (`
c
1, 2) ∼ (`c2, 2) ∼ (`c3, 2) ∼ (c, 2)  (a∅, 1).
That is, players c1, c2, and c3 prefer to engage alone in their approved literal activity, whereas
sc wants to join one of the adjacent leaves whenever pi(sc) = a∅ and that leaf is assigned
a literal activity; however, the leaf would then prefer to switch to the void activity. This
means that if there exists a Nash stable outcome, at least one of the literal activities must
be used outside of Nc, and some leaf and the stalker sc must be assigned to activity c.
Correctness. We will show that φ is satisfiable if and only if there exists a Nash stable
outcome.
Suppose that there exists a truth assignment that satisfies φ. First, for each variable x
that is set to true, we assign positive literal activities x1 and x2 to the positive literal players
p1(x) and p2(x), respectively, and assign x to the negative literal players p¯1(x) and p¯2(x).
For each variable x that is set to false, we assign negative literal activities x¯1 and x¯2 to
the negative literal players p¯1(x) and p¯2(x), respectively, and assign x to the positive literal
players p1(x) and p2(x). Note that this procedure uses at least one of the literal activities `
c
1,
`c2 and `
c
3 of each clause c ∈ C, since the given truth assignment satisfies φ. Then, for each
clause c ∈ C, we select a player cj whose approved activity `cj has been assigned to some
literal player, and assign cj and the stalker to c, and the rest of the clause players to their
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approved literal activity if it is not used yet, and to the void activity otherwise. It is easy to
see that the resulting assignment pi is Nash stable.
Conversely, suppose that there exists a Nash stable feasible assignment pi. By Nash
stability, for each variable x ∈ X, either a pair of positive literal players p1(x) and p2(x)
or a pair of negative literal players x¯1 and p¯2(x) should be assigned to the corresponding
pair of literal activities; in addition, for each clause c ∈ C, the stalker sc and one of the
players c1, c2, and c3 should engage in the activity c, thereby implying that the approved
literal activity of the respective leaf should be assigned to some literal players. Then, take
the truth assignment that sets the variable x to true if its positive literal players p1(x) and
p2(x) are assigned to positive literal activities x1 and x2; otherwise, x is set to false. This
assignment can be easily seen to satisfy φ.
The hardness reductions for the core and individual stability are similar to the respective
reductions for Nash stability; essentially, we have to replace copies of the stalker game from
Example 3 with copies of games with an empty core (Example 4) or with no individually
stable outcome (Example 5).
Theorem 13. Given an instance of gGASP whose underlying graph is a path, a star, or has
connected components whose size is bounded by 3, it is NP-complete to determine whether it
has a core stable feasible assignment, and it is NP-complete to determine whether it has an
individually stable feasible assignment.
Proof. Clearly, our problems are contained in NP for any social network due to Proposition
2 and the fact that we can easily check whether a given assignment is individually stable.
The hardness proofs can be found in the appendix.
5. Few Activities
In the instances of gGASP that are created in our hardness proofs, the number of activities
p is unbounded. In reality, however, there are many settings where this parameter can
be very small. For instance, when organizing social events for a workshop, the number of
activities one could organize is often restricted, due to a limited number of facilities for
sports competition or a limited number of buses for a bus trip. It is thus natural to wonder
what can be said when there are few activities to be assigned. It turns out that for each
of the restricted families of graphs considered in the previous section, finding some stable
assignments in gGASP is fixed parameter tractable with respect to the number of activities.
The basic idea behind each of the algorithms we present is that we fix a set of activities that
will be assigned to the players, and for each possible subset B ⊆ A∗ of activities we check
whether there exists a stable assignment using the activities from that subset only.
5.1 Small components
We first present an algorithm for small components based on dynamic programming, allowing
us to build up the set B step-by-step. We order the components, and, for each prefix of that
ordering, we check if a given subset of activities can be assigned to that prefix in a stable
way. Within each component, we have enough time to consider all possible assignments,
and each potential deviation involves at most one component. The resulting algorithm is
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FPT with respect to the combined parameter p+ c, where c is a bound on the size of the
components of the network.
Theorem 14. There exists an algorithm that given an instance of gGASP checks whether
it has a Nash stable or an individually stable, finds one if it exists, and runs in time
O(8ppc+1c2n) where p is the number of activities and c is the maximum size of connected
components.
Proof. We give a dynamic programming algorithm. Suppose our graph (N,L) has k con-
nected components (N1, L1), (N2, L2), . . . , (Nk, Lk) and each component has size at most c,
i.e., |Ni| ≤ c for all i ∈ [k]. For each i ∈ [k], each set B ⊆ A∗ of activities assigned to N ,
and each set B′ ⊆ B of activities assigned to ⋃ij=1Nj , we let NS[i, B,B′] and IS[i, B,B′]
denote whether there is such an assignment that gives rise to a Nash stable outcome and an
individually stable outcome, respectively. Specifically, NS[i, B,B′] (respectively, IS[i, B,B′])
is true if there exists an individually rational feasible assignment pi :
⋃i
j=1Nj → A such that
• the set of activities assigned to ⋃ij=1Nj is exactly B′; and
• no player in ⋃ij=1Nj has an NS (respectively, IS) feasible deviation to an activity in
B′ or to an activity in A∗ \B.
Otherwise, NS[i, B,B′] (respectively, IS[i, B,B′]) is false.
For i = 1, each B ⊆ A∗, and each B′ ⊆ B, we compute the value of NS[1, B,B′]
(respectively, IS[1, B,B′]) by trying all possible mappings pi : N1 → B′ ∪ {a∅}, and checking
whether it is an individually rational feasible assignment using all activities in B′ and such
that no player in N1 has an NS (respectively, IS) feasible deviation to a used activity in B
′
or an unused activity in A∗ \B.
For i = 2, 3, . . . , k, each B ⊆ A∗, and B′ ⊆ B, we set NS[i, B,B′] (respectively, IS[i, B,B′])
to true if there exists a bipartition of B′ into P and Q such that NS[i− 1, B, P ] is true and
there exists a mapping pi : Ni → Q ∪ {a∅} such that pi is an individually rational feasible
assignment using all the activities in Q, and no player in Ni has an NS (respectively, IS)
feasible deviation to a used activity in Q or an unused activity in A∗ \ B. This property
holds because players cannot deviate to an activity played within a different connected
component by feasibility.
It is not difficult to see that a Nash stable (respectively, individually stable) solution exists
if and only if NS[k,B,B] (respectively, IS[k,B,B]) is true for some B ⊆ A∗. If this is the
case, such a stable feasible assignment can be found using standard dynamic programming
techniques. The size of the dynamic programming table NS[i, B,B′] (respectively, IS[i, B,B′])
is at most 4pn. For each entry, we consider O(2p) bipartitions of B′ and the time required
to find a stable assignment for a single component is O(pc+1c2). Thus, each entry can be
filled in time O(2ppc+1c2). This completes the proof.
The FPT result for graphs with small connected components can also be adapted to the
core. The proof can be found in the appendix.
Theorem 15. There exists an algorithm that given an instance of gGASP checks whether it
has a core stable feasible assignment, finds one if it exists, and runs in time O(8ppc+1c3n)
where p is the number of activities and c is the maximum size of connected components.
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5.2 Acyclic graphs
We will next show that computing Nash and individually stable outcomes is in FPT for
arbitrary acyclic networks. Essentially, we will construct a rooted tree and check in a
bottom-up manner whether there is a partial assignment that is extensible to a stable
outcome.
Theorem 16. The problem of deciding whether an instance of gGASP with |A∗| = p whose
underlying social network (N,L) is acyclic has a Nash stable feasible assignment is in FPT
with respect to p.
Proof. We will first present a proof for the case where (N,L) is a tree; in the end, we will
show how to extend the result to arbitrary forests. Fix an instance (N,A, (i)i∈N , L) of
gGASP such that (N,L) is a tree. We choose an arbitrary node in N as the root of this
tree, thereby making (N,L) a rooted tree; we denote by ch(i) the set of children of i and by
desc(i) the set of descendants of i (including i herself). Intuitively, we fix the set B ⊆ A∗ of
activities assigned to the set of all players; then, we process the nodes from the leaves to
the root, and for each player i and each subset B′ of B, we check whether there is a partial
assignment of B′ to the descendants of i that is extensible to a stable assignment.
Formally, for each i ∈ N , each B ⊆ A∗, each B′ ⊆ B, each (a, k) ∈ (B′ × [n]) ∪ {(a∅, 1)},
and each t ∈ [k], we let NS[i, B,B′, (a, k), t] be true if there is an assignment pi : N → A
where
(i) the set of activities assigned to players in desc(i) is exactly B′;
(ii) player i is assigned to a and is in a coalition with k other players;
(iii) exactly t players in desc(i) belong to the same group as i, so |desc(i) ∩ pii| = t;
(iv) the t players in desc(i) ∩ pii weakly prefer (a, k) to (b, 1) for each b ∈ A \B, and have
no incentive to deviate to the other groups, i.e., every player in desc(i) ∩ pii whose
children do not belong to pii likes (a, k) at least as much as each of the alternatives
she can deviate to;
(v) the players in desc(i) \ pii weakly prefer their alternative under pi to engaging alone in
any of the activities in A \B, have no NS-deviation to activities in B′ \ {a}, and have
no incentive to deviate to i’s coalition, i.e., if a 6= a∅, then every player j ∈ desc(i) \ pii
whose parent belongs to pii likes (pi(j), |pij |) at least as much as (a, k + 1).
Otherwise, we let NS[i, B,B′, (a, k), t] be false. By construction, our instance admits a Nash
stable assignment if and only if NS[r,B,B′, (a, k), k] is true for some combination of the
arguments B,B′, and (a, k), where r is the root, because by (iv) and (v) there are then no
NS-deviations. Notice that the size of the dynamic programming table is at most p4pn3. See
Figure 4a for the high-level idea of the algorithm.
To complete the proof, we show that values NS[i, B,B′, (a, k), t] can be efficiently com-
puted in a bottom-up manner. If i is a leaf, we set NS[i, B,B′, (a, k), t] to true if B′ = {a},
t = 1, and i weakly prefers (a, k) to every alternative (b, 1) such that b ∈ A \B; otherwise,
we set NS[i, B,B′, (a, k), t] to false.
19
Igarashi, Bredereck, Peters, & Elkind
r
i
desc(i)
B B′
(a)
P1 P2 P3 P4
j1 j2 j3 j4 j5
(b)
Figure 4: Figure 4a describes the high-level idea of the algorithm: at each subtree, the algorithm
checks whether the descendants desc(i) can be assigned to the activity set B′, when the whole tree
only uses the activity set B. Figure 4b illustrates how each subtree is matched to a different activity
set.
Now, consider the case when i is an internal vertex. We order the children of i and let
ch(i) = {j1, j2, . . . , j|ch(i)|}. Observe that in each feasible assignment pi : desc(i)→ B′ the
coalition of players that engage in the same activity b ∈ B′ \ {a} is fully contained in a
subtree of some child of i. This induces a partition P = {P1, P2, . . . , P|P|} of the activity
set B′ \ {a} and a permutation/indexing of these activity sets so that the activities in Pi
are assigned to the subtree of ji. We will thus go through all possible partitions of B
′ \ {a}
and their permutations, and try to find a feasible assignment compatible with it. Figure 4b
illustrates how each subtree is matched to a different activity set.
We first check whether i strictly prefers some alternative (b, 1) such that b ∈ A \B to
(a, k); if so, we set NS[i, B,B′, (a, k), t] to false. Otherwise, we proceed and guess a partition
and indexing P = {P1, P2, . . . , P|P|} of B′ \ {a}. Now we will show that we can determine
in polynomial time whether there exists of a stable assignment compatible with this indexed
partition.
Claim 17. There exists an algorithm that given a partition P = {P1, P2, . . . , P|P|} of B′\{a},
checks whether there exists a feasible assignment pi : N → A such that the conditions (i) to
(v) hold, and each activity set in P is assigned to the players in desc(j) for some j ∈ ch(i)
in such a way that for every q ∈ [|P|] and c ∈ [|ch(i)|], Pq is assigned to desc(jc) only if the
prefix P1, P2, . . . , Pq−1 are assigned to the subtrees desc(j1), desc(j2), . . . ,desc(jc−1), finds
one if it exists, and runs in time O(p2n3) with respect to the number of activities p.
Proof. We give a dynamic programming algorithm. Observe that a stable assignment can
allocate only activity a or nothing to players before allocating the activity set P1 to some
subtree. For convention, we thus denote P0 by the empty activity set, which may be assigned
to the first c subtrees where the subtree desc(jc+1) is assigned to the activity set P1. We will
now determine for each c ∈ [|ch(i)|] and q ∈ [0, |P|] whether the activity sets P0, P1, . . . , Pq
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can be assigned to the subtrees rooted at j1, j2, . . . , jc, and exactly ` players can be assigned
to the activity a; we refer to this subproblem by T [jc, Pq, `].
We initialize T [j1, Pq, `] to true if
• the empty activity set P0 can be allocated to the first subtree desc(j1), i.e., q = 0,
` = 0, and NS[j1, B, ∅, (a∅, 1), 1] is true, and (a = a∅ or j weakly prefers (a∅, 1) to
(a, k + 1)); or
• only the activity a can be assigned to ` players in desc(j1), i.e., q = 0, ` ≥ 1, and
NS[j1, B, {a}, (a, k), `] is true;
• only the activity set P1 can be assigned to players in desc(j1), i.e., q = 1, ` = 0, and
there exists an alternative (b, x) ∈ P1 × [n] ∪ {(a∅, 1)} such that NS[j1, B, P1, (b, x), x]
is true, b = a∅ or i weakly prefers (a, k) to (b, x+ 1), and (a = a∅ or j1 weakly prefers
(b, x) to (a, k + 1)); or
• P1 can be assigned to players in desc(j1), and activity a can be assigned to ` players
from desc(j1), i.e., q = 1, ` ≥ 1, and NS[j1, B, P1 ∪ {a}, (a, k), `] is true.
We set T [j1, Pq, `] to false otherwise.
Then, we iterate through j1, j2, . . . , j|ch(i)| and P0, P1, . . . , P|P|, and update T [jc, Pq, `]:
for each c ∈ [|ch(i)|], for each q ∈ [0, |P|], and for each ` ∈ [0, t], we set T [jc, Pq, `] to true if
one of the following statements holds:
• P1, P2, . . . , Pq can be assigned to the subtrees desc(j1),desc(j2), . . . ,desc(jc−1) with `
players from the subtrees being assigned to the activity a, and the void activity can
be assigned to the subtree desc(jc), i.e., both T [jc−1, Pq, `] and NS[jc, B, ∅, (a∅, 1), 1]
are true, and a = a∅ or player jc weakly prefers (a∅, 1) to (a, k + 1);
• P1, P2, . . . , Pq can be assigned to the subtrees desc(j1),desc(j2), . . . ,desc(jc−1) while
the activity a is assigned to x players from the subtrees desc(j1), desc(j2), . . . ,desc(jc−1)
and to `−x players from the subtree desc(jc), i.e., ` ≥ 2, and there exists an x ∈ [`−1]
such that T [jc−1, Pq, `− x] and NS[jc, B, {a}, (a, k), x] are true;
• P1, P2, . . . , Pq−1 can be assigned to the subtrees desc(j1), desc(j2), . . . ,desc(jc−1) with
` players from the subtrees being assigned to the activity a, and only the activity
set Pq can be assigned to the subtree desc(jc), i.e., T [jc−1, Pq−1, `] is true, and there
exists an alternative (b, x) ∈ Pq × [n]∪{(a∅, 1)} such that NS[jc, B, Pq, (b, x), x] is true,
(b = a∅ or i weakly prefers (a, k) to (b, x+ 1)), and (a = a∅ or jc weakly prefers (b, x)
to (a, k + 1));
• P1, P2, . . . , Pq−1 can be assigned to the subtrees desc(j1), desc(j2), . . . ,desc(jc−1) and
Pq can be assigned to the subtree desc(jc) while the activity a is assigned to x players
from the subtrees desc(j1),desc(j2), . . . ,desc(jc−1) and to `−x players from the subtree
desc(jc), i.e., ` ≥ 2, and there exists an x ∈ [`− 1] such that both T [jc−1, Pq−1, `− x]
and NS[jc, B, Pq ∪ {a}, (a, k), x] are true.
We set T [jc, Pq, `] to false otherwise.
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Clearly, a desired assignment exists if and only if T [j|ch(i)|, P|P|, t− 1] is true. The size of
the dynamic programming table is at most pn2 and each entry can be filled in O(pn) time.
This prove the claim.
The size of the dynamic programming table NS[i, B,B′, (a, k), t] is at most 4ppn3. For
each entry, we consider at most (p + 1)p partitions of B′ \ {a}, and for each partition at
most p! permutations; further, for each permutation we have shown that there exists an
O(p2n3) time algorithm that checks the existence of a stable assignment compatible with it.
Hence we conclude that our problem for trees can be solved in O(4p(p+ 1)pp!p3n6) time.
Now, if (N,L) is a forest, we can combine the FPT algorithm described above with the
algorithm for graphs with small connected components in the proof of Theorem 14. The
running time of the latter algorithm is a product of the time required to find a Nash stable
assignment for a single connected component and the time required to combine solutions for
different components; As we have seen, the former is O(pc+1c2), where c is the maximum
component size and the latter is O(2pn). In our case, each connected component is a tree,
so instead of the O(pc+1c2) algorithm for general graphs we can use our FPT algorithm for
trees. This shows that our problem is in FPT for arbitrary forests.
The proof for individual stability is similar and can be found in the appendix.
Theorem 18. The problem of deciding whether an instance of gGASP with |A∗| = p whose
underlying social network (N,L) is acyclic has an individually stable feasible assignment is
in FPT with respect to p.
Core stability turns out to be more computationally challenging than Nash stability and
individual stability when the number of activities is small and the graph is a star: we will
now show that core stable assignments are hard to find even if there are only two activities
and the underlying graph is a star (and thus one cannot expect an FPT result with respect
to the number of activities for this setting). Later, we will see that this hardness result can
be extended to the case where (N,L) is a clique, i.e., to standard GASP, thereby solving a
problem left open in the work of Darmann (2015).
Theorem 19. It is NP-complete to determine whether an instance of gGASP admits a core
stable assignment even when the underlying graph is a star and the number of non-void
activities is 2.
Proof. Our problem is in NP by Proposition 2. To establish NP-hardness, we reduce from
the NP-complete problem Exact Cover by 3-Sets (X3C) (Garey & Johnson, 1979). Given
a finite set V = {v1, v2, . . . , v3k} and a collection S = {S1, S2, . . . , Sm} of 3-element subsets
of V , X3C asks whether S admits an exact cover S ′ ⊆ S, i.e., |S ′| = k and V = ⋃Si∈S′ Si.
Given an instance of X3C, we construct an instance of gGASP as follows. We define the
set of activities to be A∗ = {a, b}. We introduce a center player c, two players x1 and x2,
and a player Sj for each Sj ∈ S.
Idea. We will construct the dummies of each vi ∈ V and the preferences of players as
follows:
1. The players c, x1, and x2 form an empty core instance; thus, in order to stabilize them,
the center c needs to be assigned to activity a, together with k players from S, and x2
must be assigned to activity b.
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2. If the dummies of vi and the players corresponding to the sets including vi (denoted
by S(vi)) are assigned to the void activity, then these players together with the center
c and x2 will form a blocking coalition of size β(vi) and deviate to activity b.
Construction details. For each vi ∈ V , we let S(vi) = {Sj | vi ∈ Sj ∈ S } and
β(vi) = i+ 3k + 1 and create a set Dummy(vi) = {d(1)i , d(2)i , . . . , d(β(vi)−|S(vi)|−2)i } of dummy
players. We attach each of the dummies to the center c. Intuitively, for each i ∈ [3k] the
number β(vi) is the target coalition size when all players in Dummy(vi) are engaged in
activity b, together with c, x2, and the players in S(vi). Note that the values β(vi) are at
least 3 and distinct over i ∈ [3k]. We then attach to the center, the players x1, x2, all the
players in S, and all the dummy players. The illustration of the graph is presented in Figure
5.
cx1 x2
S1
S2
Sm
Dummy(v1)
Dummy(v2)
Dummy(v3k)
Figure 5: The graph constructed in the hardness proof for Theorem 19.
Now the players’ preferences are defined as follows. For each Sj ∈ S, we let Bj =
{b} × {β(vi) | vi ∈ Sj }; also, set B =
⋃
Sj∈S Bj . The preferences of each player Sj ∈ S are
given by
Sj : (a, k + 1)  Bj  (a∅, 1).
For each i ∈ [3k] the dummy players in Dummy(vi) only approve the alternative (b, β(vi)).
Finally, the preferences of x1, c, and x2 are given by
x1 : (b, 2)  (a, 3)  (a∅, 1)
c : (a, 2)  (b, 2)  (a, 3)  B  (a, k + 1)  (a∅, 1)
x2 : (a, 3)  B  (b, 1)  (a, 2)  (a∅, 1).
Note that the preferences of c, x1 and x2, when restricted to A× [1, 2, 3], form an instance
of gGASP with an empty core (Example 4).
Correctness. We will show that (V,S) admits an exact cover if and only if there exists a
core stable feasible assignment.
Let S ′ be an exact cover in (V,S). Then, we construct a feasible assignment pi by
assigning activity a to the player c and the players Sj ∈ S ′, assigning b to the player x2,
and assigning the void activity to the remaining players. Clearly, pi is individually rational
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since |S ′| = k and hence |pia| = k + 1. Further, notice that no connected subset T together
with activity a strongly blocks pi: by the definition of a blocking coalition, every such subset
has to contain the players in S ′, who are currently enjoying one of their top alternatives.
It remains to show that no connected subset T together with activity b strongly blocks pi.
Suppose towards a contradiction that such a subset T exists; as x2 ∈ T , it must be the case
that |T | = β(vi) for some vi ∈ V and hence T consists of agents who approve (b, β(vi)),
i.e., T = {c, x2} ∪ S(vi) ∪ Dummy(vi) for some vi ∈ V . However, since S ′ is an exact cover,
there is a set Sj ∈ S ′ ∩ S(vi) with pi(Sj) = a, and this agent prefers (a, k+ 1) to (b, β(vi)), a
contradiction. Hence, pi is core stable.
Conversely, suppose that there exists a core stable feasible assignment pi and let S ′ =
{Sj ∈ S | pi(Sj) = a }.
We will first argue that pi(c) = a. Indeed, if pi(c) = b and the only other agent to engage
in b is x1, then pi
a = ∅ since no player approves (a, 1); thus, the players c and x2 can deviate
to a. If pi(c) = b and |pib| = β(vi) for some vi ∈ V then pia = ∅ and c, x1 and x2 can deviate
to a. If pi(c) = a∅, then pia = ∅ and the players c, x1, and x2 would deviate to a. It follows
that pi(c) = a. Now, if pia = {c, x2} then pib = ∅ and agent x2 can deviate to b. Similarly, if
pia = {c, x1, x2} then pib = ∅, and c and x1 can deviate to b. If follows that |pia| = k + 1 and
hence |S ′| = k. Also, since there is no coalition assigned to an alternative in B, x2 must be
engaged alone in activity b; otherwise, the player can deviate to b.
Now, if S ′ is not an exact cover for (V,S), there exists an element vi ∈ V such that no
player in S(vi) is assigned to a; that is, all players in S(vi) are assigned to the void activity.
Then the coalition {c, x2} ∪ S(vi) ∪ Dummy(vi) together with the activity b strongly blocks
pi, contradicting the stability of pi. Thus, S ′ is an exact cover for (V,S).
The hardness result in Theorem 19 immediately generalizes to instances of gGASP with
more than two activities: we can modify the construction in our hardness reduction by
introducing additional activities that no player wants to engage in. In contrast, checking
the existence of core stable assignments in gGASP is easy if |A∗| = 1, irrespective of the
structure of the social network.
Proposition 20. Every instance of gGASP with A = {a, a∅} admits a core stable assignment;
moreover, such an assignment can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. Consider an instance (N, (i))i∈N , A, L) of gGASP with A = {a, a∅}, and let n = |N |.
For each s ∈ [n], let Ss be the set of all players who weakly prefer (a, s) to (a∅, 1). If for each
s ∈ [n] the largest connected component of Ss with respect to (N,L) contains fewer than s
agents, then no outcome in which a non-empty set of agents engages in a is individually
rational, whereas the assignment pi given by pi(i) = a∅ for all i ∈ N is core stable. Otherwise,
consider the largest value of s such that Ss has a connected component of size at least s.
Find a connected subset of Ss of size exactly s, and assign the agents in this subset to a;
assign the remaining agents to a∅. To see that this assignment is core stable, note that
for every deviating coalition S we would have |S| > s, and hence such a coalition is either
disconnected or some players in S prefer (a∅, 1) to (a, |S|).
It is not clear if the problem of finding core stable assignments in gGASP is in FPT with
respect to the number of activities when the underlying graph is a path. However, we can
place this problem in XP with respect to this parameter. In fact, we have the following
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more general result for graphs with few connected coalitions (see the work of Elkind (2014)
for insights on the structure of such graphs).
Proposition 21. Given an instance (N, (i))i∈N , A, L) of gGASP with |N | = n, |A| = p+1,
such that the number of non-empty connected subsets of (N,L) is κ, we can decide in time
O(κp) · poly(n, p) whether this instance admits a core stable assignment, and find one such
assignment if it exists.
Proof. Let C1, . . . , Cκ be the list of all non-empty connected subsets of (N,L). Since each
assignment of players to activities has to assign a connected (possibly empty) subset of
players to each activity, we can bound the number of possible assignments by (κ+ 1)p: each
of the p non-void activities is assigned to a coalition in our list or to no player at all, and the
remaining players are assigned the void activity. We can then generate all these assignments
one by one and check if any of them is core stable; by Proposition 2, the stability check can
be performed in time polynomial in n and p.
If the social network (N,L) is a path, it has O(|N |2) connected subsets. Thus, we obtain
the following corollary.
Corollary 22. The problem of deciding whether a given instance of gGASP whose underlying
graph is a path admits a core stable assignment is in XP with respect to the number of
activities.
5.3 Cliques
It is unlikely that our FPT results can be extended to even cliques: our next result shows
that the problem of finding a Nash stable outcome is W[1]-hard with respect to the number
of activities even for classic GASP, i.e., when the social network imposes no constraints on
possible coalitions and players have approval preferences.
Theorem 23. The problem of determining whether an instance of gGASP admits a Nash
stable is W[1]-hard with respect to the number of activities, even if the underlying graph
G = (N,L) is a clique.
Proof. We will provide a parameterized reduction from Clique on regular graphs. Given
an undirected graph G = (V,E) and a positive integer k, Clique asks if G admits a clique
of size k. The problem is known to be W[1]-hard even for regular graphs, i.e., graphs where
each vertex has the same degree (see e.g. Theorem 13.4 in the book of Cygan et al. (2015)).
Given a regular graph G = (V,E) and a positive integer k, where |V | = n, |E| = m, and
each vertex of G has degree δ ≥ k − 1, we create an instance of gGASP whose underlying
graph is a clique, as follows. We create one vertex activity ai for each i ∈ [k], one edge
activity bj for each j ∈ [k(k − 1)/2], and two other activities c and d. The set of non-void
activities is given by
A∗ = { ai | i ∈ [k] } ∪ { bj | j ∈ [k(k − 1)/2] } ∪ {c, d}.
For each v ∈ V , we create one vertex player v, and for each edge e = {u, v} ∈ E, we create
two edge players euv and evu.
Idea. We will create dummies of vertices and edges in such a way that a stable assignment
has the following properties:
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1. if a vertex player v is assigned to a vertex activity, it forms a coalition of size α(v)
that consists of the player v, its dummies, and δ − k + 1 edge players incident to the
vertex; and
2. if an edge player evu is assigned to an edge activity, it forms a coalition of size β(e)
that consists of the edge player euv, evu, and the dummies of the edge {u, v}.
Construction details. Let P = {2j + n | j ∈ [n]}, and let α : V → P be a bijection
that assigns a distinct number in P to each vertex v ∈ V . Note that u 6= v implies that
α(u) and α(v) differ by at least 2, i.e., α(u) + 1 6= α(v) and α(v) + 1 6= α(u). Similarly, let
Q = {2j | j ∈ [m]} and let β : E → Q be a bijection that assigns a distinct number in Q to
each edge e ∈ E. For each v ∈ V we construct a set Dummy(v) of α(v)− δ + k − 2 dummy
vertex players. Similarly, for each e ∈ E we construct a set Dummy(e) of β(e)− 2 dummy
edge players. Lastly, we create one stalker s. The set of players is given by
N = V ∪
⋃
v∈V
Dummy(v) ∪ E ∪
⋃
e∈E
Dummy(e) ∪ {s}.
Now the preferences are given as follows.
• Each vertex player v ∈ V approves the alternatives (c, n− k) and (d, 1) as well as each
alternative (ai, α(v)) where i ∈ [k].
• Each dummy in Dummy(v) of a vertex player v approves the alternatives (ai, α(v))
and (ai, α(v) + 1) where i ∈ [k].
• Each edge player evu approves the alternatives (ai, α(v)) and (ai, α(v) + 1) where
i ∈ [k] as well as the alternatives (bj , β(e)) where j ∈ [k(k − 1)/2].
• The dummies in Dummy(e) only approve the alternatives (bj , β(e)) where j ∈ [m].
• The stalker s approves the alternative (d, 2).
All of these players are indifferent among all alternatives they approve. Finally, we take
the underlying social network to be a complete graph. Note that the number of activities
depends on k, but not on n, and the size of our instance of gGASP is bounded by O(n2+m2).
Correctness. We will now argue that the graph G contains a clique of size k if and only
if there exists a Nash stable assignment for our instance of gGASP.
Suppose that G contains a clique S of size k. We construct an assignment pi as follows.
We assign the activity c to all vertex players who do not belong to S. The size of this
coalition is n − k. We then assign the vertex activities to the rest of vertex players and
its dummies: We take some bijection η between S and [k], and for each v ∈ V we form
a coalition of size α(v) that engages in aη(v): this coalition consists of v, all players in
Dummy(v), and all edge players evu such that u 6∈ S. Lastly, we assign the edge activities to
the edge players both of whose endpoints are in S: we establish a bijection ξ between the
edge set { e = {u, v} ∈ E | u, v ∈ S } and [k(k − 1)/2], and assign the activity bξ(e) to the
edge players euv and evu as well as to all players in Dummy(e). All other players, namely
the stalker s as well as the remaining edge players and dummy players, are assigned the void
activity. We will now argue that the resulting assignment pi is Nash stable.
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Clearly, no player assigned to an activity ai, bj , or c wishes to deviate. Now, consider
a dummy of some vertex v that is assigned to the void activity. By construction, we have
pi(v) = c. The dummy only wants to join a coalition if there is a coalition which engages in
an activity ai and whose size is α(v)− 1 or α(v); however, no such coalition exists. Similarly,
consider an edge player evu with pi(evu) = a∅. We have v 6∈ S, and therefore evu does not
want to join any of the existing coalitions because they have the wrong sizes; the same
argument applies to all the dummies of e. Further, the stalker s does not want to deviate
since there is no coalition of size 1 that engages in an activity d. Hence, pi is Nash stable.
Conversely, suppose that there exists a Nash stable feasible assignment pi. By individual
rationality of pi, every player engages either in the void activity or in an approved alternative.
Notice that if a vertex player v were assigned to the activity d, the stalker s would have an
NS-deviation to d; thus, no player is assigned to d. If a vertex player v were assigned to the
void activity, then v would have an NS-deviation to activity d. Thus, pi cannot allocate vertex
players to either d or the void activity. This means that pi must allocate the activity c to n−k
vertex players, and allocate the k vertex activities ai to the remaining k vertex players v,
each together with α(v)− 1 other players. Now, let S = {v ∈ V | pi(v) = ai for some i ∈ [k]}.
By construction, |S| = k. We will show that S is a clique. That is, we prove the following
claim.
Claim 24. For any v ∈ S, v is adjacent to every other vertex in S, i.e., there are k − 1
edge players evu with u ∈ S.
Proof. Consider a player v ∈ S, and let pi(v) = ai. Observe that by individual rationality
|piai | = α(v); thus, all players in Dummy(v) are assigned to ai since otherwise they could
deviate to ai. The only other players who approve (ai, α(v)) are edge players evu. Thus,
δ − k + 1 such players must be assigned to ai, and the remaining k− 1 of these players must
be assigned to some activity bj , since otherwise they would deviate to ai. It remains to show
that the k− 1 edge players assigned to some bj are incident to vertices in S. For each v ∈ S,
consider the set of players Epi,v = {evu | v ∈ S, pi(evu) = bj for some j ∈ [k(k − 1)/2]}. We
have argued that |Epi,v| = k − 1 for each v. Thus, |
⋃
v∈S Epi,v| = k(k − 1).
Now, let Epi be the set of all edge players who are assigned to edge activities bj .
Clearly
⋃
v∈S Epi,v ⊆ Epi. Note that by individual rationality, each edge activity bj can
be assigned to at most two edge players simultaneously (namely, to the two edge players
euv, evu corresponding to edge e). Since there are k(k − 1)/2 edge activities, it follows that
|Epi| ≤ k(k − 1). Therefore, we must have⋃
v∈S
Epi,v = Epi. (2)
Now, consider an edge player evu with v ∈ S and pi(evu) = bj for some j ∈ [k(k − 1)/2].
By individual rationality we have |pibj | = β({u, v}) and hence pibj consists of evu, euv and
all dummies of the edge {u, v}. By (2), we have euv ∈
⋃
v∈S Epi,v ⊆ Epi, and so we see that
u ∈ S.
Hence, we conclude that S is a clique of size k.
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We note that if players have approval preferences, individually and core stable outcomes
can be computed in polynomial time for any network structure: one can repeatedly find
activity a and a maximal unanimous coalition S all of whose members approve a, assign S
to a, and remove the activity a and the players in S from consideration. However, if we allow
full preference orders, deciding the existence of an individually stable outcome is W[1]-hard
with respect to the number of activities for standard GASP i.e., the graph is a clique. The
proof can be found in the appendix.
Theorem 25. The problem of determining whether an instance of gGASP admits an indi-
vidually stable assignment is W[1]-hard with respect to the number of activities, even if the
underlying graph G = (N,L) is a clique.
On the positive side, for gGASPs on cliques, a Nash stable assignment turns out be
computable in polynomial time if the number of activities is a constant. However, it is open
if this result can be extended to general gGASPs.
Theorem 26. There exist an algorithm that, given an instance (N,A, (i)i∈N , L) of gGASP
with |N | = n, |A| = p+ 1 such that (N,L) is a clique, determines whether it admits a Nash
stable assignment in time (n+ 1)p+1O(np(n+ p)).
Proof. For every mapping f : A→ [0, n] where ∑a∈A f(a) = n, we will check if there is a
Nash stable assignment pi such that |pia| = f(a) for each a ∈ A∗ and |{ i ∈ N | pi(i) = a∅ }| =
f(a∅). There are at most (n+ 1)p+1 such mappings; hence, it remains to show that each
check will take at most poly(n) steps.
Fix a mapping f : A → [0, n] with ∑a∈A f(a) = n. We construct an instance of the
network flow problem as follows. We introduce a source s, a sink t, a node i for each player
i ∈ N , and a node a for each activity a ∈ A. We create an arc with unit capacity from the
source s to each player, and an arc with capacity f(a) from node a ∈ A to the sink t. Then,
for each i ∈ N we create an arc of unit capacity from player i to an activity a ∈ A if and
only if
• a 6= a∅, and i weakly prefers (a, f(a)) to (a∅, 1) and to all pairs of the form (b, f(b) + 1),
where b ∈ A∗ \ {a}; or
• a = a∅, and i weakly prefers (a∅, 1) to all pairs of the form (b, f(b) + 1), where b ∈ A∗.
It can be easily verified that an integral flow of size n in this network corresponds to a Nash
stable assignment where exactly f(a) players are engaged in each activity a ∈ A. It remains
to note that one can check in O(|V ||E|) time whether a given network (V,E) admits a flow
of a given size (Orlin, 2013).
A similar argument applies to individual stability: finding an individually stable assign-
ment can be done in polynomial time if the number of activities is a constant.
Theorem 27. There exist an algorithm that, given an instance (N,A, (i)i∈N , L) of gGASP
with |N | = n, |A| = p + 1 such that (N,L) is a clique, determines whether it admits an
individually stable assignment in time 2p(n+ 1)p+1O(np(n+ p)).
Proof. For every mapping f : A → [0, n] and g : A∗ → {0, 1}, we will check if there is an
individually stable assignment such that
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(i) for each a ∈ A∗, |pia| = f(a), and |{ i ∈ N | pi(i) = a∅ }| = f(a∅);
(ii) for each a ∈ A∗ with g(a) = 1, pia contains a player i who does not want to increase
the size of a group, that is, who strictly prefers (a, f(a)) to (a, f(a) + 1); and
(iii) for each a ∈ A∗ with g(a) = 0, no player wants to deviate to pia.
There are at most 2p(n + 1)p+1 such combinations of mappings. We will show that each
check will take at most poly(n) steps.
Fix a mapping f : A∗ → [0, n] and g : A∗ → {0, 1}. Let A0 = { a ∈ A∗ | g(a) = 0 } and
A1 = { a ∈ A∗ | g(a) = 1 }.
We construct an instance of the network flow problem as follows. We introduce a source s,
a sink t, a node i for each player i ∈ N , a node a for each a ∈ A0 ∪ {a∅}, and two nodes a
and x(a) for each activity a ∈ A1. We create an arc with unit capacity from the source s to
each player, and an arc with capacity f(a) from node a ∈ A0 ∪ {a∅} to the sink t. For each
a ∈ A1 with f(a) ≥ 1, we create an arc with capacity f(a)− 1 from node a to the sink t,
and an arc with unit capacity from node x(a) to the sink t. Then, for each i ∈ N
• we create an arc of unit capacity from player i to a node a ∈ A∗ if and only if i weakly
prefers (a, f(a)) to (a∅, 1) and to all pairs of the form (b, f(b) + 1), where b ∈ A0 \ {a};
• we create an arc of unit capacity from player i to a node x(a) where a ∈ A1 if and only
if i strictly prefers (a, f(a)) to (a, f(a) + 1), and i weakly prefers (a, f(a)) to (a∅, 1)
and to all pairs of the form (b, f(b) + 1), where b ∈ A0 \ {a};
• finally, we create an arc of unit capacity from player i to the void activity a∅ if and
only if i weakly prefers (a∅, 1) to all pairs of the form (b, f(b) + 1), where b ∈ A0.
It can be easily verified that an integral flow of size n in this network corresponds to an
individually stable assignment satisfying the conditions (i) - (iii). Again, one can check in
polynomial time whether a given network admits a flow of a given size (Orlin, 2013), and
hence our theorem follows.
For core stability, Theorem 19 can be extended from stars to cliques; however, our proof
for cliques relies on having at least four non-void activities. It remains an interesting open
problem whether core stable outcomes of gGASPs on cliques can be found efficiently if the
number of activities does not exceed 3. We conjecture that the answer is ‘no’, i.e., the
problem of computing core stable outcomes remains NP-hard for |A∗| = 2, 3. The proof for
the theorem below can be found in the appendix.
Theorem 28. It is NP-complete to determine whether an instance of gGASP admits a core
stable assignment even if the underlying graph is a clique and the number of activities is 4.
6. Few Players
In the previous sections, the parameter that we focused on was the number of activities p.
Although we expect this parameter to be small in many realistic settings, there are also
situations where players can choose from a large variety of possible activities. Assume, for
instance, that a small number of scientists are gathering at the university of a large city
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which offers plenty of options for social, cultural, or sports activities. Usually, the number
of options is much larger than the number of people attending. It is, thus, natural to ask
if stability-related problems for gGASP are tractable in the number of players n is small.
In this section, we give a negative answer by showing that even classical GASP remains
W[1]-hard with respect to the number of players n.
We first observe that for all stability concepts considered in this paper, the problem of
finding a stable feasible assignment is in XP with respect to n: we can simply guess the
activity of each player (there are at most (p+ 1)n possible guesses) and check whether the
resulting assignment is feasible and stable.
Observation 29. The problem of deciding whether a given instance of gGASP admits a core
stable, Nash stable, or individually stable assignment is in XP with respect to the number of
players n.
The following theorem shows that gGASP is not fixed-parameter tractable with respect
to n unless FPT = W[1]. This is somewhat surprising, because an FPT algorithm with
respect to n could afford to iterate through all possible partitions of the players into coalitions.
Thus, the computational difficulty must arise from deciding which group engages in which
activity, rather than from deciding who belongs to which group. Indeed, in the following
hardness reduction, there is a unique partition of players into coalitions that can potentially
lead to a stable assignment; thus, computational hardness comes solely from assigning known
coalitions of players to activities.
Theorem 30. The problem of determining whether an instance of gGASP whose underlying
graph is a clique admits a core stable assignment is W[1]-hard with respect to the number of
players n.
Proof. We describe a parameterized reduction from the W[1]-hard Multicolored Inde-
pendent Set problem (see, e.g., Corollary 13.8 in the book of Cygan et al. (2015)). Given
an undirected graph G = (V,E), a positive integer h ∈ N, and a vertex coloring φ : V → [h],
Multicolored Independent Set asks whether G admits an h-colored independent set,
that is, a size-h vertex subset Q ⊆ V such that no pair of distinct vertices in Q is adjacent
and the vertices in Q have h pairwise distinct colors. Without loss of generality, we assume
that there are exactly q vertices of each color for some q ∈ N, and that there are no edges
between vertices of the same color.
Let (G, h, φ) be an instance of Multicolored Independent Set with G = (V,E).
For convenience, we write V (i) = {v(i)1 , . . . , v(i)q } to denote the set of vertices of color i for
every i ∈ [h]. We construct our gGASP instance as follows. We have one vertex activity v
for each vertex v ∈ V , one edge activity e for each edge e ∈ E, and four other activities a, b,
c, and d.
Idea. We will have one color gadget Color(i) for each color i ∈ [h] and one empty core
gadget Ng. For most of the possible assignments, the empty core gadget will be unstable,
unless the following holds:
1. For each color i ∈ [h], the players from the color gadget select a vertex of color i (by
being assigned together to the corresponding vertex activity).
2. For each pair of colors {i, j}, the corresponding selected vertices are not adjacent.
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3. The stabilizer player g forms a coalition with the players in Ng.
If all three conditions hold, then the assignment encodes an h-colored independent set.
Construction details. The color gadget Color(i), i ∈ [h] consists of two players p(i)1 and p(i)2
with the following preferences:
p
(i)
1 : E(v
(i)
1 )× {5}  (v(i)1 , 2)  E(v(i)2 )× {5}  (v(i)2 , 2)  · · ·
· · ·  E(v(i)q )× {5}  (v(i)q , 2)  (a∅, 1),
p
(i)
2 : E(v
(i)
q )× {5}  (v(i)q , 2)  E(v(i)q−1)× {5}  (v(i)q−1, 2)  · · ·
· · ·  E(v(i)1 )× {5}  (v(i)1 , 2)  (a∅, 1),
where E(v) denotes the set of activities corresponding to edges incident to vertex v.
The stabilizer g approves each alternative of the form (e, 5) with e ∈ E and is indifferent
among them; she also approves (d, 4), but likes it less than all other approved alternatives:
g : E × {5}  (d, 4)  (a∅, 1).
Finally, Ng consists of three players g1, g2, and g3 with the following preferences:
g1 : (d, 4)  (b, 2)  (a, 3)  (a∅, 1),
g2 : (d, 4)  (a, 2)  (b, 2)  (a, 3)  (a∅, 1),
g3 : (d, 4)  (a, 3)  (b, 1)  (a, 2)  (a∅, 1).
In a core stable assignment, the activity d should be assigned to the players in Ng together
with the stabilizer g; otherwise, the assignment would not be stable as we have seen in
Example 4.
Together, there are 2h+ 4 players, namely
N =
⋃
i∈[h]
Color(i) ∪ {g} ∪Ng.
We take the underlying social network to be a complete graph.
Correctness. We will now argue that the graph G admits an h-colored independent set if
and only if our instance of gGASP admits a core stable feasible assignment.
Suppose that there exists an h-colored independent set H. We will construct a core
stable assignment pi as follows: We assign the players of the color gadget Color(i) to the
activity corresponding to the vertex of color i from H, and we assign the activity d to players
in Ng and the stabilizer g. This assignment is core stable: Clearly, no player from Ng wishes
to deviate since they are assigned to their top alternatives. Consider the players of color
gadget Color(i). They cannot deviate to another vertex activity, since they have completely
opposed preferences over vertex activities of size 2. Now suppose towards a contradiction
that there is a coalition S that blocks pi together with some edge activity e = {v(i)`i , v
(j)
`j
}.
Activity e is approved by exactly 5 players, and only with size 5. Thus, S must consist of
exactly these 5 players, namely the stabilizer g and the players in Color(i) and Color(j). Now
we see that the edge e must be incident to the vertex activity assigned to the two players
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in Color(i) (otherwise one of these players would prefer their current alternative to (e, 5))
and similarly e must be adjacent to the vertex activity assigned to the players in Color(j).
However, this means that there is a pair of adjacent vertices in H, contradicting the fact
that H is an independent set. We conclude that pi is a core stable feasible assignment.
Conversely, suppose that there exists a core stable feasible assignment pi. Then, by
core stability, the stabilizer g as well as the players in Ng must be assigned to the activity
d. Now, consider some edge activity corresponding to some edge e = {v(i)`i , v
(j)
`j
}. Recall
that e is approved by exactly five players: two player from color gadget Color(i), two players
from color gadget Color(j), and the stabilizer g. However, all five players approve the edge
activity only of size five and g does engage in activity d and not in e. Thus, for every i ∈ [h],
the two players from Color(i) must be assigned to some vertex activity in V (i). Now, let
H = { v | pi(p(i)1 ) = v for some i ∈ [h] }. We have argued that |H| = h. It remains to show
that H is an independent set. Suppose towards a contradiction that there are vertices v
(i)
`i
and v
(j)
`j
in H that are adjacent. Notice that the players in Color(i) strictly prefers the edge
activity e = {v(i)`i , v
(j)
`j
} with size 5 to their vertex activity with size 2. Similarly, the players
in Color(j) as well as the stabilizer g strictly prefer the edge activity e with size 5 to their
alternatives. Together with the activity e, these players can block pi, a contradiction to the
core stability of pi.
The proofs for Nash and individually stability are related to the above reduction, but
technically more involved and can be found in the appendix.
Theorem 31. The problem of determining whether an instance of gGASP whose underlying
graph is a clique admits a Nash stable or individually stable assignment is W[1]-hard with
respect to the number of players n.
Note that although we showed W[1]-hardness for each of the parameters p and n, param-
eterizing by the combined parameter p+ n immediately gives fixed-parameter tractability,
since the input size is trivially upper-bounded by n2 · p.
7. Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper, we have initiated the study of group activity selection problems with network
structure, and found that even for very simple families of graphs, computing stable outcomes
is NP-hard. We identified several ways to circumvent this computational intractability. For
gGASPs with copyable activities, we showed that there exists a polynomial time algorithm to
compute stable outcomes. We then investigated the parameterized complexity of computing
stable outcomes of group activity selection problems on networks, with respect to two natural
parameters. Many of our hardness results hold for the standard GASP, where there are no
constraints on possible coalitions; however, some of our positive results only hold for acyclic
graphs.
Interestingly, one of our tractability results holds for GASP, but it is not clear if it
can be extended to gGASP; thus, while simple networks may decrease complexity, allowing
for arbitrary networks may have the opposite effect. However, counterintuitively, for core
stability we obtain hardness with just 2 activities when the undelying network is simple
(a star), whereas for cliques our construction uses 4 activities. It is not clear if this is an
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artefact of our proof approach, or whether finding core stable outcomes is genuinely easier
for cliques than for stars.
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Appendix. Proof omitted from Section 3
Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. The algorithm is similar to the one for hedonic games (Igarashi & Elkind, 2016). We
first give an informal description of our algorithm (Algorithm 2), followed by pseudocode.
Again, if the input graph (N,L) is a forest, we can process each of its connected components
separately, so we assume that (N,L) is a tree. We choose an arbitrary node r as the
root and construct a rooted tree (N,T ) by orienting the edges in L towards the leaves.
We denote by ch(i) the set of children of i and by desc(i) the set of descendants of i
(including i) in the rooted tree. For each i ∈ N , we define height(i) = 0 if ch(i) = ∅,
and height(i) = 1 + max{ height(j) | j ∈ ch(i) } otherwise. We denote by (N,T |S) the
subdigraph induced by S ⊆ N , i.e., T |S = { (i, j) ∈ T | i, j ∈ S }.
The algorithm has two different phases: the bottom-up and top-down phases.
• Bottom-up phase: In the bottom-up phase, we will determine guaranteed activity a(i)
and coalition S(i) for every subroot i. To this end, we start with the assignment
obtained by combining the previously constructed assignments a(j) for the children j
of i and assigning i to the void activity. We then let player i join the most preferred
activity among those to which she has an IS deviation. After that we keep adding
players to i’s coalition S(i) as long as the resulting coalition remains feasible, the player
being added is willing to move, and such a deviation is acceptable for all members of
i’s coalition.
• Top-down phase: In the top-down phase, the algorithm builds a feasible assignment
pi, by iteratively choosing a root r′ of the remaining rooted trees and reassigning the
activity a(r′) to its coalition S(r′). Since each activity is copyalbe, we can always find
an activity that is equivalent to a(r′) and has not been used by their predecessors.
We will now argue that Algorithm 2 correctly finds an individually stable feasible
assignment. We start by observing the following lemma.
Lemma 32. For all i ∈ N , the following statements hold:
(i) i has no incentive to deviate to an alternative of size 1, i.e., (a(i), |S(i)|) i (b, 1) for
all b ∈ A,
(ii) i has no IS-deviation to her children’s coalitions, i.e., (a(i), |S(i)|) i (a(j), |S(j)|+ 1)
for any j ∈ C∗(i), and
(iii) all players in S(i) weakly prefer (a(i), |S(i)|) to their guaranteed alternative (a(j), |S(j)|).
Proof. The statements (i) and (ii) in Lemma 32 immediately follow from the choice of a(i)
in lines 4 – 11 and the stopping criterion of the while loop in line 14.
We will now prove (iii). Assume that there is a pair of players not satisfying the condition
(iii). Among such pairs, take i ∈ N and j ∈ S(i) with |height(i) − height(j)| being the
minimum. First, suppose that j joins the coalition S(i) when S(i) is initialized in line
12. Then, (a(j∗), |S(j∗)|) j (a(j), |S(j)|) by the minimality but we have (a(i), |S(i)|) j
(a(j∗), |S(j∗)|) by the fact that adding players to S(i) does not decrease j’s utility, which
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Algorithm 2: Finding individually stable assignments
input : tree (N,L), activity set A = A∗ ∪ {a∅}, r ∈ N , preference i, i ∈ N
output : pi : N → A
1 // Bottom-up phase: assign activities to players in a bottom-up
manner.;
2 make a rooted tree (N,T ) with root r by orienting all the edges in L;
3 initialize S(i)← {i} and a(i)← a∅ for each i ∈ N ;
4 foreach t = 0, . . . ,height(r) do
5 foreach i ∈ N with height(i) = t do
6 // Let i join the favourite activity to which i has an
IS-deviation. set
C∗(i) = { j ∈ ch(i) | (a(j), |S(j)|+ 1) k (a(j), |S(j)|) for all k ∈ S(j) };
7 if there exists b ∈ A such that (b, 1) i (a(j), |S(j)|+ 1) for all j ∈ C∗(i) then
8 find b∗ ∈ A such that (b∗, 1) i (b, 1) for all b ∈ A;
9 set S(i)← {i} and a(i)← b∗;
10 else
11 find j∗ ∈ C∗(i) such that (a(j∗), |S(j∗)|+ 1) i (a(j), |S(j)|+ 1) for all
j ∈ C∗(i);
12 set S(i)← S(j∗) ∪ {i} and a(i)← a(j∗) ;
13 // Add a player to S(i) as long as the deviation is IS-feasible.;
14 while (a(i), |S(i)|+ 1) k (a(i), |S(i)|) for all k ∈ S(i) and there exists
j ∈ N \ S(i) such that j’s parent belongs to S(i) and
(a(i), |S(i)|+ 1) j (a(j), |S(j)|) do
15 S(i)← S(i) ∪ {j};
16 // Top-down phase: relabel players with their predecessor’s
activities;
17 set N ′ ← N and A′ ← A∗;
18 while N ′ 6= ∅ do
19 choose a root r′ of some connected component of the digraph (N ′, T |N ′) and find
an activity b ∈ A′ ∪ {a∅} that is equivalent to a(r′);
20 set pi(i)← b for all i ∈ S(r′);
21 set N ′ ← N ′ \ S(r′) and A′ ← A′ \ {b};
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leads to (a(i), |S(i)|) j (a(j), |S(j)|), a contradiction. Second, suppose that the player j
has been added to S(i) in the while loop in line 14. This would mean that j strictly prefers
(a(i), |S(i)|) to (a(j), |S(j)|) at the time of termination, a contradiction.
Now, by (iii) in Lemma 32, it can be easily verified that (pi(i), |pii|) i (a(i), |S(i)|) for
all i ∈ N . Combining this with (i), we know that at the assignment pi, all players weakly
prefer their alternatives to engaging alone in unused activities or the void activity. It thus
remains to show that no player has an IS deviation to used activity. Suppose towards a
contradiction that there is a player i who has an IS feasible deviation to the activity pi(j)
of her neighbour j. If the player j is a child of i, this would mean that all players in S(j)
accept i, i.e., j ∈ C∗(i), and i strictly prefers (pi(j), |pij |+ 1) to her alternative, namely,
(a(j), |S(j)|+ 1) = (pi(j), |pij |+ 1) i (pi(i), |pii|) i (a(i), |S(i)|),
contradicting (ii) in Lemma 32. If the player j is the parent of i in the rooted tree T , j must
have been added to pij in the while loop in line 14, a contradiction. We conclude that no
player has an IS-deviation to used activities, and hence pi is individually stable.
It remains to analyze the running time of Algorithm 2. Consider the execution of the
algorithm for a fixed player i. Let c = |ch(i)| and d = |desc(i)|. Line 4 requires at most
d queries: no descendant of i is queried more than once. Lines 5 – 10 require p queries.
Moreover, at each iteration of the while loop in lines 12–14 at least one player joins S(i),
so there are at most d iterations, in each iteration we consider at most d candidates, and for
each candidate we perform at most d queries. Summing over all players, we conclude that
the number of queries for the bottom-up phase is bounded by O(n(n2 + p)). It is immediate
that the top-down phase can be done in polynomial time. This completes the proof of the
theorem.
Appendix. Proofs omitted from Section 4
Proof of Theorem 13
Proof. We give separate proofs for the three types of networks considered: paths, stars, and
graphs with small components.
Paths. We prove hardness via a reduction from Path Rainbow Matching.
Construction. Given an instance (G, C, φ, k) of Path Rainbow Matching where
|C| = q, we create a vertex player v for each v ∈ V and an edge player e for each e ∈ E. To
create the social network, we first construct the graph (NG, LG) as defined in the proof for
Theorem 10. To the right of the graph (NG, LG), we attach a path consisting of garbage
collectors {g1, g2, . . . , gq−k} and q copies (Nc, Lc) of the empty-IS instance of Example 5
where Nc = {c1, c2, c3} and Lc = {{c1, c2}, {c2, c3}} for each c ∈ C. For each color c ∈ C, we
introduce a color activity c, and introduce additional activities a(c) and b(c). Each vertex
player v approves color activities φ(e) of its adjacent edges e with size 3; each edge player e
approves the color activity φ(e) of its color with size 3; each garbage collector gi approves
any color activity c with size 1; finally, the preference for players in Nc (c ∈ C) is cyclic and
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given by
c1 : (b(c), 2)  (a(c), 1)  (c, 3)  (c, 2)  (c, 1)  (a∅, 1)
c2 : (c, 3)  (c, 2)  (a(c), 2)  (b(c), 2)  (b(c), 1)  (a∅, 1)
c3 : (c, 3)  (a(c), 2)  (a(c), 1)  (a∅, 1)
Correctness. We will now prove that the following three statements are equivalent.
(i) There exists an individually stable feasible assignment.
(ii) There exists a core stable feasible assignment.
(iii) G contains a rainbow matching of size at least k.
(i) or (ii) =⇒ (iii): We will show that if one of two stable solutions exists, then there exists a
rainbow matching of size at least k. First, suppose that there is a core or individually stable
feasible assignment pi : N → A. Let M = { e ∈ E | pi(e) ∈ C }. We will show that M is a
rainbow matching of size at least k. To see this, notice that at pi, all the color activities
should be played outside Nc’s, since otherwise no core or individually stable assignment
would exist as we have seen in Example 5. Further, at most q − k colour activities are
played among the garbage collectors, which means that at least k colour activities should be
assigned to vertex and edge players. The only individual rational way to do this is to select
triples of the form (u, e, v) where e = {u, v} ∈ E and assign to them their colour activity
φ(e); thus, M is a rainbow matching of size at least k.
(iii) =⇒ (i) and (ii): Suppose that there exists a rainbow matching M of size k. We construct
a feasible assignment pi where for each e = {u, v} ∈ M we set pi(e) = pi(u) = pi(v) = φ(e),
each garbage collector gi, i ∈ [q − k], is arbitrarily assigned to one of the remaining q − k
color activities, each pair of c2 and c3 (c ∈ C) is assigned to a(c), and the remaining players
are assigned to the void activity. The assignment pi is individually stable, since every garbage
collector as well as every edge or vertex player assigned to a color activity is allocated their
top alternative, and no remaining player has an IS feasible deviation. Similarly, it can be
easily verified that pi is core stable.
Stars. Again, we reduce from a restricted variant of MMM where the graph is a bipartite
graph. We have seen that computing a core stable outcome is NP-hard for stars in Theorem
19; hence, we only provide a hardness proof for individual stability.
Construction. Given a bipartite graph (U, V,E) and an integer k, we construct an
instance of gGASP on a path as follows. We create a star with center c and the |V | + 2
leaves: one leaf for each vertex v ∈ V plus two other players s1 and s2. We then introduce
an activity u for each u ∈ U , and four other simple activities a, x, y, and z.
A player v ∈ V approves (u, 1) for each u ∈ U such that {u, v} ∈ E as well as (a, |V |−k+1)
and prefers the former to the latter. That is, (u, 1) v (a, |V | − k + 1) for any u ∈ U with
{u, v} ∈ E; v is indifferent among activities associated with its neighbors in the graph, that
is, (u, 1) ∼v (u′, 1) for all u, u′ ∈ U such that {u, v}, {u′, v} ∈ E. The center player c strictly
prefers (a, |V | − k+ 1) to any other alternative, and has the same cyclic preferences over the
alternatives of x, y, and z as in Example 5 together with players s1 and s2; explicitly, the
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preferences are given by
s1 : (y, 2)  (x, 1)  (z, 3)  (z, 2)  (z, 1)  (a∅, 1)
c : (a, |V | − k + 1)  (z, 3)  (z, 2)  (x, 2)  (y, 2)  (y, 1)  (a∅, 1)
s2 : (z, 3)  (x, 2)  (x, 1)  (a∅, 1).
Here, s1’s (respectively, the center c and the player s2) preference corresponds to the
one for player 1 (respectively, player 2 and player 3) in Example 5.
Correctness. We will show that there exists an individually stable feasible assignment if
and only if G contains a maximal matching of size at most k.
Suppose that there exists an individually stable feasible assignment pi and let M =
{ {pi(v), v} | v ∈ V ∧ pi(v) ∈ U }. We will show that M is a maximal matching of size at
most k. By stability, the center player and |V | − k vertex players are assigned to the activity
a; otherwise, no individually stable outcome would exist as we have seen in Example 5; thus,
|M | ≤ k. Notice further that M is a matching since each vertex player v plays at most one
activity, and by individual rationality each vertex activity should be assigned to at most one
player. Now suppose towards a contradiction that M is not maximal, i.e., there exists an
edge {u, v} ∈ E such that u ∈ U , v ∈ V , and M ∪ {u, v} is a matching. This would mean
that pi assigns no player to activity u and no vertex activity to player v. Hence, the player v
has an IS-deviation to the vertex activity u, contradicting the stability of pi.
Conversely, suppose that G admits a maximal matching M with at most k edges. We
construct a feasible assignment pi by setting pi(v) = u for each {u, v} ∈ M , and assigning
|V | − k non-matched vertex players and the center to a, assigning s1 to x, and assigning the
remaining players to the void activity. The center c is allocated to her top alternative; hence
no player has an IS-deviation to an activity a and the center does not want to deviate to a
used vertex activity activity. No vertex player v has an IS-deviation to an unused vertex
activity u, since if such a pair {u, v} existed, this would mean that {u, v} is not included in
M , and hence M ∪ {u, v} forms a matching, which contradicts the maximality of M . Hence,
pi is individually stable. This completes the proof.
Small components. We reduce from (3,B2)-Sat.
Construction. Consider a formula φ with variable set X and clause set C, where for
each variable x ∈ X we write x1 and x2 for the two positive occurrences of x, and x¯1 and x¯2
for the two negative occurrences of x. We construct an instance of gGASP as follows. For
each variable x ∈ X, we introduce three variable players v1(x), v2(x), and v3(x); and we
also introduce three positive variable players p1(x), p2(x), and p3(x), and three negative
variable players p¯1(x), p¯2(x), and p¯3(x). For each clause c ∈ C, we introduce three players
Nc = {c1, c2, c3}. The network consists of one component for each clause c ∈ C: a star with
center c2 and leaves c1 and c3, and of three components for each variable x ∈ X:
• a star with center v2(x) and leaves v1(x) and v3(x),
• a star with center p2(x) and leaves p1(x) and p3(x), and
• a star with center p¯2(x) and leaves p¯1(x) and p¯3(x).
Hence, the size of each connected component of this graph is at most 3. Corresponding to
the variable occurrences, we introduce two positive literal activities x1 and x2, two negative
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literal activities x¯1 and x¯2 for each x ∈ X; we also introduce one variable activity x, and
eight further activities y(x), z(x), a(x), b(x), c(x), a¯(x), b¯(x), and c¯(x). Thus, the set of
activities given by
A∗ =
⋃
x∈X
{x1, x2, x¯1, x¯2, x, y(x), z(x), a(x), b(x), c(x), a¯(x), b¯(x), c¯(x)}.
For each x ∈ X, the preferences of variable players are given as follows:
v1(x) : (y(x), 2)  (x, 1)  (z(x), 3)  (z(x), 2)  (z(x), 1)  (a∅, 1),
v2(x) : (z(x), 3)  (z(x), 2)  (x, 2)  (y(x), 2)  (y(x), 1)  (a∅, 1),
v3(x) : (z(x), 3)  (x, 2)  (x, 1)  (a∅, 1).
Notice that the preferences are cyclic; thus, in a core or individually stable assignment, one
of the activities x, y(x), and z(x) must be allocated outside of the variable players v1(x),
v2(x), and v3(x). For each x ∈ X, the preferences of the three positive variable players
p1(x), p2(x), and p3(x) are given as follows:
p1(x) : (x, 3) ∼ (x1, 1)  (b(x), 2)  (a(x), 1)  (c(x), 3)  (c(x), 2)  (c(x), 1)  (a∅, 1),
p2(x) : (x, 3) ∼ (x2, 1)  (c(x), 3)  (c(x), 2)  (a(x), 2)  (b(x), 2)  (b(x), 1)  (a∅, 1),
p3(x) : (x, 3)  (c(x), 3)  (a(x), 2)  (a(x), 1)  (a∅, 1).
Similarly, for each x ∈ X, the preferences of the negative variable players p¯1(x), p¯2(x), and
p¯3(x) are given as follows:
p¯1(x) : (x, 3) ∼ (x¯1, 1)  (b¯(x), 2)  (a¯(x), 1)  (c¯(x), 3)  (c¯(x), 2)  (c¯(x), 1)  (a∅, 1),
p¯2(x) : (x, 3) ∼ (x¯2, 1)  (c¯(x), 3)  (c¯(x), 2)  (a¯(x), 2)  (b¯(x), 2)  (b¯(x), 1)  (a∅, 1),
p¯3(x) : (x, 3)  (c¯(x), 3)  (a¯(x), 2)  (a¯(x), 1)  (a∅, 1).
Again, observe that the preferences of each triple contains a cyclic relation, and hence in a
core stable assignment and an individually stable assignment, there are three possible cases:
• all the three players p1(x), p2(x), and p3(x) are assigned to x1, x2, and a(x), respectively,
and players p¯1(x), p¯2(x), and x¯ are assigned to activities x¯1 , x¯2, and a¯(x), respectively;
• all the three players p1(x), p2(x), and p3(x) are assigned to x, and players p¯1(x), p¯2(x),
and x¯ are assigned to activities x¯1 , x¯2, and a¯(x), respectively; or,
• all the players p¯1(x), p¯2(x), and p¯3(x) are assigned to x, and players p1(x), p2(x), and
p3(x) are assigned to activities x1, x2, and a(x), respectively.
Later we will see that the last two cases can only occur in a stable assignment.
For each clause c ∈ C where `c1, `c2, and `c3 are the literals in a clause c, the preferences
for clause players c1, c2, and c3 are again cyclic and given as follows:
c1 : (`
c
2, 2)  (`c1, 1)  (`c3, 3)  (`c3, 2)  (`c3, 1)  (a∅, 1),
c2 : (`
c
3, 3)  (`c3, 2)  (`c1, 2)  (`c2, 2)  (`c2, 1)  (a∅, 1),
c3 : (`
c
3, 2)  (`c1, 3)  (`c1, 1)  (a∅, 1).
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If there exists a core or individually stable outcome, it must be the case that at least one of
the literal activities `c1, `
c
2, and `
c
3 must be used outside of the three players c1, c2, and c3;
otherwise, no feasible assignment would be individually stable.
Correctness. Now we will show that the following three statements are equivalent.
(i) There exists an individually stable feasible assignment.
(ii) There exists a core stable feasible assignment.
(iii) The formula φ is satisfied by some truth assignment.
(i) or (ii) =⇒ (iii): Suppose that there exists a core or individually stable feasible assignment
pi. By stability, for each variable x ∈ X, one of the activities x, y(x), and z(x) must be
assigned outside of the variable players v1(x), v2(x), and v3(x). The only individually
rational way to do this is to assign the variable activity x to either the positive variable
players p1(x), p2(x), and p3(x), or the negative variable players p¯1(x), p¯2(x), and p¯3(x),
meaning that either a pair of positive literal activities x1 and x2 or a pair of negative literal
activities x¯1 and x¯2 should be assigned to the corresponding pair of variable players. Further,
for each clause c, at least one of the literal activities `c1, `
c
2, and `
c
3 should be played outside
of the clause players c1, c2, and c3. Then, take the truth assignment that sets the variables
x to true if their positive variable players p1(x) and p2(x) are assigned to positive literal
activities x1 and x2; otherwise, x is set to false; this can be easily seen to satisfy φ.
(iii) =⇒ (i) and (ii): Suppose that there exists a truth assignment that satisfies φ. We
construct a feasible assignment pi as follows. First, for every variable x ∈ X, we assign z(x)
to the variable players v1(x), v2(x), and v3(x). Then, for each variable x that is set to true,
we assign positive literal activities x1, x2, and a(x) to positive variable players p1(x), p2(x),
and p3(x), respectively, and assign a variable activity x to players p¯1(x), p¯2(x), and p¯3(x).
For each variable x that is set to false, we assign negative literal activities x¯1, x¯2, and a¯(x)
to negative literal players p¯1(x), p¯2(x), and p¯3(x), respectively, and assign a variable activity
x to players p1(x), p2(x), and p3(x). Note that this procedure uses at least one of the literal
activities `c1, `
c
2 and `
c
3 of each clause c, since the given truth assignment satisfies φ. Then,
for each clause c ∈ C, we assign activities to the clause players c1, c2, and c3 as follows.
• If all the activities are already assigned in a previous step, then we assign the void
activity to all the clause players c1, c2, and c3.
• If `c1 is already assigned and `c3 is not assigned, then we assign `c3 to all the clause
players c1, c2, and c3.
• If `c3 is already assigned and `c1 is not assigned, then we assign `c1 to the players c2, and
c3.
• If both `c1 and `c3 are already assigned and `c2 is not assigned, then we assign `c2 to the
player c1 and c2.
The resulting assignment pi of players to activities is individually stable, because no variable
player wishes to change their alternative and no player of each Nc has an IS feasible deviation.
Similarly, it can be easily verified that pi is core stable.
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Appendix. Proofs omitted from Section 5
Proof of Theorem 15
Proof. Again, we give a dynamic programming algorithm. Suppose our graph (N,L)
has k connected components (N1, L1), (N2, L2), . . . , (Nk, Lk). For each i ∈ [k], each set
B ⊆ A∗ of activities assigned to N , and each set B′ ⊆ B of activities assigned to ⋃ij=1Nj ,
we let CR[i, B,B′] to be true if there exists an individually rational feasible assignment
pi :
⋃i
j=1Nj → A such that
• the set of activities assigned to ⋃ij=1Nj is exactly B′; and
• no connected subset S ⊆ ⋃ij=1Nj together with an activity in B′ ∪ (A∗ \B) strongly
blocks pi
Otherwise, CR[i, B,B′] is false.
For i = 1, each B ⊆ A∗, and each B′ ⊆ B, we compute the value of CR[1, B,B′] by
trying all possible mappings pi : N → B′ ∪ {a∅}, and checking whether it is an individually
rational feasible assignment using all activities in B′ and such that none of the connected
subsets S ⊆ N1 together with an activity in B′ ∪ (A∗ \B) strongly blocks pi.
For i = 2, 3, . . . , k, each B ⊆ A∗, and B′ ⊆ B, we set CR[i, B,B′] to true if there exists
a bipartition of B′ into P and Q such that CR[i − 1, B, P ] is true and there exists an
individually rational feasible assignment pi : Ni → Q ∪ {a∅} such that each activity in Q is
assigned to some player in Ni, and none of the connected subsets S ⊆ Ni together with an
activity in Q ∪ (A∗ \B) strongly blocks pi.
It is not difficult to see that a core stable solution exists if and only if CR[k,B,B] is true
for some B ⊆ A∗. If this is the case, such a stable feasible assignment can be found using
standard dynamic programming techniques. The size of the dynamic programming table is
at most 4pn. There are at most 2p bipartitions of B′, and for each bipartition, we consider
O(pc) possible assignments; further, for each assignment, we have shown that there is an
O(pc3) time algorithm to check the existence of a strongly blocking coalition. Thus, each
entry can be filled in time O(2ppc+1c3). This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 18
Proof. Again, given a tree (N,L), we choose an arbitrary node as the root and construct a
rooted tree by orienting the edges in L towards the leaves; we denote by ch(i) the set of
children of i and by desc(i) the set of descendants of i (including i).
We process the nodes from the leaves to the root. For each i ∈ N , each B ⊆ A∗, each
B′ ⊆ B, each (a, k) ∈ B′× [n]∪{(a∅, 1)}, and each t ∈ [k], we will again check whether there
is a partial assignment of B′ to i’s descendants that is extensible to a stable assignment,
assuming that the whole players are assigned to the activities in B. Here, there are three
cases: first, the i’s coalition may admit a deviation from their descendants but some player
who does not want to increase the size of the coalition may join the coalition later on (possibly
stable); second, there is already a player in the i’s coalition who does not want to increase
the size of the coalition (definitely stable); third, no descendant of i’s coalition wants to
deviate to it (weakly stable). For all three concepts, all coalitions of descendants of i that do
not involve i are immune to any IS-deviation.
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Formally, we first let PS[i, B,B′, (a, k), t] be true if there exists a feasible assignment
pi : N → A where
(i) the set of activities assigned to players in desc(i) is exactly B′;
(ii) player i is assigned to a and is in a coalition with k other players;
(iii) exactly t players in desc(i) belong to the same group as i;
(iv) the t players in desc(i) ∩ pii weakly prefer (a, k) to (b, 1) for each b ∈ A \B, and has
no IS-deviation to the activities assigned to players in Di \ pii; and
(v) the players in desc(i) \ pii weakly prefer their alternative under pi to engaging alone in
any of the activities in A \B, and have no IS-deviations to activities in B′ \ {a}.
Otherwise, we let PS[i, B,B′, (a, k), t] be false. Second, we let DS[i, B,B′, (a, k), t] be true if
there exists a feasible assignment pi : N → R such that (i) - (v) hold, and (vi) a = a∅ or some
player in desc(i) ∩ pii strictly prefers (a, k) to (a, k + 1); we let DS[i, B,B′, (a, k), t] be false
otherwise. Third, we let WS[i, B,B′, (a, k), t] be true if there exists a feasible assignment
pi : N → R such that (i) - (v) hold, and (vii) a = a∅ or no player in desc(i) \ pii strictly
prefers (a, k + 1) to their alternative under pi; we let WS[i, B,B′, (a, k), t] be false otherwise.
By construction, our instance admits an individually stable assignment if and only if
there exists a combination of the arguments B, B′, and (a, k) such that DS[t, B,B′, (a, k), k]
is true or WS[r,B,B′, (a, k), k] is true, where r is the root. In what follows, we will describe
how to compute each entry of all the three tables in a bottom-up manner.
Leaves. If i is a leaf, we set both PS[i, B,B′, (a, k), t] and WS[i, B,B′, (a, k), t] to true
if B′ = {a}, t = 1, and i weakly prefers (a, k) to any other alternative (b, 1) such that
b ∈ A \B; otherwise, we set both PS[i, B,B′, (a, k), t] and WS[i, B,B′, (a, k), t] to false. We
set DS[i, B,B′, (a, k), t] to true if PS[i, B,B′, (a, k), t] is true, and a = a∅ or i strictly prefers
(a, k) to (a, k + 1); otherwise, we set DS[i, B,B′, (a, k), t] to false.
Internal vertices. Now consider the case where i is an internal vertex; we assume that
all the values for i’s descendants have been computed. We first check whether i strictly
prefers some alternative (b, 1) such that b ∈ A \B to (a, k); if so, we set PS[i, B,B′, (a, k), t],
DS[i, B,B′, (a, k), t], and WS[i, B,B′, (a, k), t] to false. Otherwise, we proceed and check for
each partition P of B′ \ {a} and each of its permutations whether there is an allocation of
each activity set P ∈ P to some subtree rooted at i’s child that gives rise to an assignment
with the conditions described before. One can show that determining the existence of a
desired assignment can be computed in polynomial time. Then, similarly to the proof of
Theorem 18, our problem for trees is in FPT and, moreover, we can easily extend this to
arbitrary forests.
Now let us fix a partition P = {P1, P2, . . . , P|P|} of B′ \ {a}. Again, without loss of
generality, we consider an ordering P1, P2, . . . , P|P| and seek to assign each activity set to the
subtrees in that order. It remains to show that there exists a polynomial time algorithm that
determines whether there exists a feasible assignment pi : N → A such that the conditions (i)
- (v) (respectively, (i) - (vi), and (i) - (v), (vii)) hold, and each activity set in P is assigned
to the players in desc(j) for some j ∈ ch(i) in such a way that for each q ∈ [|P|] and each
c ∈ [|ch(i)|], Pq is assigned to desc(jc) only if the prefixes P1, P2, . . . , Pq−1 are assigned to
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the subtrees desc(j1),desc(j2), . . . ,desc(jc−1). To this end, we give a dynamic programming
for a respective problem; we denote by P0 the empty activity set.
Computation of PS[i, B,B′, (a, k), t]: First, for each c ∈ [|ch(i)|] and q ∈ [0, |P|], we
will check whether the activity sets P0, P1, . . . , Pq can be assigned to the subtrees rooted
at j1, j2, . . . , jc, and exactly ` players can be assigned to the activity a; we refer to this
subproblem by TP [jc, Pq, `]. We initialize TP [j1, Pq, `] to true if one of the following
statements holds:
• the empty activity set P0 can be allocated to the first subtree desc(j1), i.e., q = 0,
` = 0, and PS[j1, B, ∅, (a∅, 1), 1] is true;
• only the activity a can be assigned to ` players in desc(j1), i.e., q = 0, ` ≥ 1, and
PS[j1, B, {a}, (a, k), `] is true;
• only the activity set P1 can be assigned to players in desc(j1), i.e., q = 1, ` = 0, and
there exists an alternative (b, x) ∈ P1× [n]∪{(a∅, 1)} such that DS[j1, B, P1, (b, x), x] is
true, or WS[j1, B, P1, (b, x), x] is true and (b = a∅ or i weakly prefers (a, k) to (b, x+1));
• P1 can be assigned to players in desc(j1) while activity a can be assigned to ` players
from desc(j1), i.e., q = 1, ` ≥ 1, and PS[j1, B, P1 ∪ {a}, (a, k), `] is true.
We set TP [j1, Pq, `] to false otherwise. Then, we iterate through j1, j2, . . . , j|ch(i)| and
P0, P1, . . . , P|P|, and update T [jc, Pq, `]: for each c ∈ [|ch(i)|], for each q ∈ [|P|], and for each
` ∈ [0, t], we set T [jc, Pq, `] to true if one of the following statements holds:
• P1, P2, . . . , Pq can be assigned to the subtrees desc(j1),desc(j2), . . . ,desc(jc−1) with `
players from the subtrees being assigned to the activity a, and the void activity can
be assigned to the subtree desc(jc), i.e., both TP [jc−1, Pq, `] and PS[jc, B, ∅, (a∅, 1), 1]
are true;
• P1, P2, . . . , Pq can be assigned to the subtrees desc(j1),desc(j2), . . . ,desc(jc−1) while
the activity a is assigned to x players from the subtrees desc(j1), desc(j2), . . . ,desc(jc−1)
and to `−x players from the subtree desc(jc), i.e., ` ≥ 2, and there exists an x ∈ [`−1]
such that both TP [jc−1, Pq, `− x] and PS[jc, B, {a}, (a, k), x] are true;
• P1, P2, . . . , Pq−1 can be assigned to the subtrees desc(j1), desc(j2), . . . ,desc(jc−1) with
` players from the subtrees being assigned to the activity a, and only the activity set
Pq can be assigned to the subtree desc(jc), i.e., TP [jc−1, Pq−1, `] is true, and there
exists an alternative (b, x) ∈ Pq × [n]∪{(a∅, 1)} such that DS[jc, B, Pq, (b, x), x] is true,
or WS[jc, B, Pq, (b, x), x] is true and (b = a∅ or i weakly prefers (a, k) to (b, x+ 1));
• P1, P2, . . . , Pq−1 can be assigned to the subtrees desc(j1),desc(j2), . . . ,desc(jc−1), and
the activity set Pq can be assigned to the subtree desc(jc) while the activity a is
assigned to x players from the subtrees desc(j1), desc(j2), . . . ,desc(jc−1) and to `− x
players from the subtree desc(jc), i.e., ` ≥ 2, and there exists an x ∈ [`− 1] such that
both TP [jc−1, Pq−1, `− x] and PS[jc, B, Pq ∪ {a}, (a, k), x] are true.
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We set TP [jc, Pq, `] to false otherwise.
Computation of DS[i, B,B′, (a, k), t]: Second, for each c ∈ [|ch(i)|] and q ∈ [0, |P|], we
will check whether the activity sets P0, P1, . . . , Pq can be assigned to the subtrees rooted at
j1, j2, . . . , jc, and exactly ` players can be assigned to the activity a, and (a = a∅ or some of
the ` players strictly prefers (a, k) to (a, k + 1)); we refer to this by TD[jc, Pq, `].
If i strictly prefers (a, k) to (a, k+ 1), then we set each value TD[jc, Pq, `] to TP [j1, Pq, `].
Otherwise, we compute TD[jc, Pq, `] as follows. We initialize TD[j1, Pq, `] to true if one of
the following statements holds:
• only the activity a can be assigned to ` players in desc(j1), i.e., q = 0, ` ≥ 1, and
DS[j1, B, {a}, (a, k), `] is true;
• P1 can be assigned to players in desc(j1) while activity a can be assigned to ` players
from desc(j1), i.e., q = 1, ` ≥ 1, and DS[j1, B, P1 ∪ {a}, (a, k), `] or ) is true.
We set TD[j1, Pq, `] to false otherwise. Then, for each c ∈ [|ch(i)|], for each q ∈ [|P|], and
for each ` ∈ [0, t], we set TD[jc, Pq, `] to true if one of the following statements holds:
• P1, P2, . . . , Pq can be assigned to the subtrees desc(j1),desc(j2), . . . ,desc(jc−1) with `
players from the subtrees being assigned to the activity a, and the void activity can
be assigned to the subtree desc(jc), i.e., both TD[jc−1, Pq, `] and PS[jc, B, ∅, (a∅, 1), 1]
are true;
• P1, P2, . . . , Pq can be assigned to the subtrees desc(j1),desc(j2), . . . ,desc(jc−1) while
the activity a is assigned to x players from the subtrees desc(j1), desc(j2), . . . ,desc(jc−1)
and to ` − x players from the subtree desc(jc), i.e., ` ≥ 2, and there exists an
x ∈ [`− 1] such that both TP [jc−1, Pq, `− x] and DS[jc, B, {a}, (a, k), x] are true, or
both TD[jc−1, Pq, `− x] and PS[jc, B, {a}, (a, k), x] are true;
• P1, P2, . . . , Pq−1 can be assigned to the subtrees desc(j1), desc(j2), . . . ,desc(jc−1) with
` players from the subtrees being assigned to the activity a, and only the activity set
Pq can be assigned to the subtree desc(jc), i.e., TD[jc−1, Pq−1, `] is true, and there
exists an alternative (b, x) ∈ Pq × [n]∪{(a∅, 1)} such that DS[jc, B, Pq, (b, x), x] is true,
or WS[jc, B, Pq, (b, x), x] is true and (b = a∅ or i weakly prefers (a, k) to (b, x+ 1));
• P1, P2, . . . , Pq−1 can be assigned to the subtrees desc(j1), desc(j2), . . . ,desc(jc−1) and
Pq can be assigned to the subtree desc(jc) while the activity a is assigned to x players
from the subtrees desc(j1),desc(j2), . . . ,desc(jc−1) and to `−x players from the subtree
desc(jc), i.e., ` ≥ 2, and there exists an x ∈ [`− 1] such that both TD[jc−1, Pq−1, `−x]
and PS[jc, B, Pq∪{a}, (a, k), x] are true, or both TP [jc−1, Pq−1, `−x] and DS[jc, B, Pq∪
{a}, (a, k), x] are true.
We set TD[jc, Pq, `] to false otherwise.
Computation of WS[i, B,B′, (a, k), t]: Third, for each c ∈ [|ch(i)|] and q ∈ [0, |P|], we
will check whether the activity sets P0, P1, . . . , Pq can be assigned to the subtrees rooted
at j1, j2, . . . , jc, and exactly ` players can be assigned, and no player in desc(j) has an
incentive to deviate to i’s coalition; we refer to this subproblem by TW [jc, Pq, `]. We
initialize TW [j1, Pq, `] to true if one of the following statements holds:
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• the empty activity set P0 can be allocated to the first subtree desc(j1), i.e., q = 0, ` = 0,
PS[j1, B, ∅, (a∅, 1), 1] is true, and (a = a∅ or j1 weakly prefers (a∅, 1) to (a, k + 1));
• only the activity a can be assigned to ` players in desc(j1), i.e., q = 0, ` ≥ 1, and
WS[j1, B, {a}, (a, k), `] is true;
• only the activity set P1 can be assigned to players in desc(j1), i.e., q = 1, ` = 0, and there
exists an alternative (b, x) ∈ P1 × [n] ∪ {(a∅, 1)} such that (1). DS[j1, B, P1, (b, x), x]
is true, or (WS[j1, B, P1, (b, x), x] is true and (b = a∅ or i weakly prefers (a, k) to
(b, x+ 1))), and (2). (a = a∅ or j1 weakly prefers (b, x) to (a, k + 1));
• P1 can be assigned to players in desc(j1) while activity a can be assigned to ` players
from desc(j1), i.e., q = 1, ` ≥ 1, and WS[j1, B, P1 ∪ {a}, (a, k), `] is true.
We set TW [j1, Pq, `] to false otherwise. Then, for each c ∈ [|ch(i)|], for each q ∈ [|P|], and
for each ` ∈ [0, t], we set TW [jc, Pq, `] to true if one of the following statements holds:
• P1, P2, . . . , Pq can be assigned to the subtrees desc(j1),desc(j2), . . . ,desc(jc−1) with `
players from the subtrees being assigned to the activity a, and the void activity can
be assigned to the subtree desc(jc), i.e., both TW [jc−1, Pq, `] and PS[jc, B, ∅, (a∅, 1), 1]
are true, and a = a∅ or player jc weakly prefers (a∅, 1) to (a, k + 1);
• P1, P2, . . . , Pq can be assigned to the subtrees desc(j1),desc(j2), . . . ,desc(jc−1) while
the activity a is assigned to x players from the subtrees desc(j1), desc(j2), . . . ,desc(jc−1)
and to `−x players from the subtree desc(jc), i.e., ` ≥ 2, and there exists an x ∈ [`−1]
such that both TW [jc−1, Pq, `− x] and WS[jc, B, {a}, (a, k), x] are true;
• P1, P2, . . . , Pq−1 can be assigned to the subtrees desc(j1), desc(j2), . . . ,desc(jc−1) with
` players from the subtrees being assigned to the activity a, and Pq can be assigned
to the subtree desc(jc) with no player from the subtree being assigned to a, i.e.,
TW [jc−1, Pq−1, `] is true, and there exists an alternative (b, x) ∈ Pq × [n] ∪ {(a∅, 1)}
such that (1). DS[jc, B, Pq, (b, x), x] is true, or (WS[jc, B, Pq, (b, x), x] is true and
(b = a∅ or i weakly prefers (a, k) to (b, x+ 1))), and (2). a = a∅ or jc weakly prefers
(b, x) to (a, k + 1);
• P1, P2, . . . , Pq−1 can be assigned to the subtrees desc(j1), desc(j2), . . . ,desc(jc−1) and
Pq can be assigned to the subtree desc(jc) while the activity a is assigned to x players
from the subtrees desc(j1),desc(j2), . . . ,desc(jc−1) and to `−x players from the subtree
desc(jc), i.e., ` ≥ 2, and there exists an x ∈ [`−1] such that both TW [jc−1, Pq−1, `−x]
and WS[jc, B, Pq ∪ {a}, (a, k), x] are true.
We set TW [jc, Pq, `] to false otherwise.
A desired assignment exists if and only TP [jc, Pq, t− 1] (respectively, TD[jc, Pq, t− 1]
and TW [jc, Pq, t − 1]) is true. Clearly, the size of each dynamic programming table is at
most pn2 and each entry can be filled in polynomial time.
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Proof of Theorem 25
Proof. We provide a parameterized reduction from Clique on regular graphs. Given a
regular graph G = (V,E) and a positive integer k, where |V | = n, |E| = m, and each vertex
of G has degree δ ≥ k − 1, we create an instance of gGASP whose underlying graph is a
clique, as follows.
We create three vertex activities a
(1)
i , a
(2)
i , and a
(3)
i for each i ∈ [k], one edge activity bj
for each j ∈ [k(k − 1)/2], and four other activities d, x, y, and z. For each v ∈ V , we create
one vertex player v, and for each edge e = {u, v} ∈ E, we create two edge players euv and
evu.
Idea. We will create k empty IS-instances Ni = {p(i)1 , p(i)2 , p(i)3 } for each i ∈ [k], and
another empty IS-instance Ng = {g1, g2, g3} together with the stabilizer g; in order to
stabilize these gadgets, each activity a
(1)
i should be assigned to some vertex player, and
the stabilizer g needs to form a coalition with the players in Ng. Further, we will create
dummies of vertex and edge players in such a way that a stable assignment has the following
properties:
1. if a vertex player v is assigned to a vertex activity, it forms a coalition of size α(v)
that consists of its dummies and δ − k + 1 edge players incident to the vertex; and
2. if an edge player evu is assigned to an edge activity, it forms a coalition of size β(e)
that consists of the edge player euv and the dummies of {u, v}.
Construction details. Now, let P = {j(k + 3) + n | j ∈ [n]}, and let α : V → P be a
bijection that assigns a distinct number in P to each vertex v ∈ V . Note that u 6= v implies
that the intervals [α(u), α(u) + k + 1] and [α(v) − 1, α(v) + k] are disjoint. Similarly, let
Q = {2j | j ∈ [m]} and let β : E → Q be a bijection that assigns a distinct number in Q to
each edge e ∈ E. For each v ∈ V we construct a set Dummy(v) of α(v)− δ + k − 2 dummy
vertex players. Similarly, for each e ∈ E we construct a set Dummy(e) of β(e)− 2 dummy
edge players.
We will now define the players’ preferences.
• Each vertex player v ∈ V and the players in Dummy(v) approve each alternative
(a
(1)
i , s) where i ∈ [k] and s ∈ [α(v), α(v) + k].
• Each edge player evu approves each alternative (a(1)i , s) where i ∈ [k] and s ∈
[α(v), α(v) + k] as well as each alternative in (bj , β(e)) where j ∈ [k(k − 1)/2].
• The dummies in Dummy(e) only approve the alternatives in (bj , β(e)) where j ∈
[k(k − 1)/2].
All of these players are indifferent among all alternatives they approve. The stabilizer g
approves each alternative of the form (a
(1)
i , s) with i ∈ [k], s ∈
⋃
v∈V [α(v) + 2, α(v) + k] and
is indifferent among them; she also approves (d, 4), but likes it less than all other approved
alternatives.
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For players in Ng, we have
g1 : (d, 4)  (y, 2)  (z, 1)  (x, 3)  (x, 2)  (x, 1)  (a∅, 1),
g2 : (d, 4)  (x, 3)  (x, 2)  (z, 2)  (y, 2)  (y, 1)  (a∅, 1),
g3 : (d, 4)  (x, 3)  (z, 2)  (z, 1)  (a∅, 1).
Notice that their preference over the alternatives of x, y, and z is cyclic; hence, in an
individually stable assignment, the activity d should be assigned to all the players in Ng
together with its stablizer g; otherwise pi cannot be stable as we have seen in Example 5.
Similarly, the preference for players in Ni is cyclic and given by
p
(i)
1 : (a
(2)
i , 2)  (a(1)i , 1)  (a(3)i , 3)  (a(3)i , 2)  (a(3)i , 1)  (a∅, 1),
p
(i)
2 : (a
(3)
i , 3)  (a(3)i , 2)  (a(1)i , 2)  (a(2)i , 2)  (a(2)i , 1)  (a∅, 1),
p
(i)
3 : (a
(3)
i , 3)  (a(1)i , 2)  (a(1)i , 1)  (a∅, 1).
Again, in an individually stable assignment, at least one of the three activities a
(1)
i , a
(2)
i , a
(3)
i
must be assigned outside of Ni; the only individual rational way to do this is to assign the
activity a
(1)
i to other players.
Finally, we take the underlying social network to be a complete graph. Note that the
number of activities depends on k, but not on n, and the size of our instance of gGASP is
bounded by O(n2 +m2).
Correctness. We will now argue that the graph G contains a clique of size k if and only
if there exists an individually stable assignment for our instance of gGASP. Suppose that
G contains a clique S of size k. We construct an assignment pi as follows. We establish a
bijection η between S and [k], and for each v ∈ V we form a coalition of size α(v) that engages
in aη(v): this coalition consists of v, all players in Dummy(v), and all edge players evu such
that u 6∈ S. Also, we establish a bijection ξ between the edge set { e = {u, v} ∈ E | u, v ∈ S }
and [k(k − 1)/2], and assign the activity bξ(e) to the edge players euv, evu as well as to all
players in Dummy(e). Finally, we set pi(p
(i)
1 ) = pi(p
(i)
2 ) = pi(p
(i)
3 ) = a
(3)
i for each i ∈ [k] and
pi(g) = pi(g1) = pi(g2) = pi(g3) = d, and assign the void activity to the remaining players.
We will now argue that the resulting assignment pi is individually stable.
Clearly, no player assigned to an activity a
(1)
i or bj wishes to deviate. Now, consider a
player v ∈ N with pi(v) = a∅; by construction, v only wants to join a coalition if it engages
in an activity a
(1)
i and its size is in the interval [α(v)− 1, α(v) + k], and no such coalition
exists. The same argument applies to players in Dummy(v). Similarly, consider an edge
player evu with pi(evu) = a∅. We have v 6∈ S, and therefore evu does not want to join any of
the existing coalitions; the same argument applies to all dummies of e = {u, v}. Further,
players in Ni do not want to deviate since players p
(i)
2 and p
(i)
3 are allocated to their top
alternative and the activity a
(1)
i is assigned to at least one player. Also, players in Ng do
not want to deviate since they are allocated one of their top choices. Finally, the stabilizer g
does not want to deviate, since there is no coalition of size s ∈ ⋃v∈V [α(v) + 1, α(v) + k − 1]
that engages in an activity a
(1)
i . Hence, pi is individually stable.
Conversely, suppose that there exists an individually stable feasible assignment pi. Notice
that pi cannot allocate an activity a
(1)
i to players in Ni, or leave it unallocated, since no
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such assignment can be individually stable. Thus, each vertex activity a
(1)
i is allocated to a
coalition whose size lies in the interval [α(v), α(v) + k] for some v ∈ V . Further, individual
stability implies that pi allocates the activity d to the players in Ng and its stabilizer g. Now,
if some vertex activity a
(1)
i is assigned to s players, where s ∈ [α(v) + 1, α(v) + k − 1] for
some v ∈ V , the stabilizer g would then deviate to that coalition. Further, for each v ∈ V ,
the number of players other than g who approve the alternatives of the form (a
(1)
i , α(v) + k)
is at most α(v) + k − 1 but g is assigned to d; thus, for each a(1)i we have |pia
(1)
i | = α(v) for
some v ∈ V . Consider a player v ∈ S, and let a(v) be the activity assigned to α(v) players
under pi. We have pi(v) = a(v), since otherwise v has an IS-deviation to a(v).
Now, let S = {v ∈ V | pi(v) = a(1)i for some i ∈ [k]}. By construction, |S| = k. We can
show that S is a clique in a similar manner to the proof of Claim 24.
Proof of Theorem 28
Proof. Our problem is in NP by Proposition 2. We again reduce from X3C. Let (V,S) be
an instance of X3C where V = {v1, v2, . . . , v3k} and S = {S1, S2, . . . , Sm}.
We define the set of activities by A∗ = {a, b, c1, c2}. We introduce three players x1, x2, x3
and one player Sj for each Sj ∈ S.
Idea. Again, we will create the dummies of each vi ∈ V and the preferences of players as
follows:
• The players x1, x2, and x3 form an empty core instance. In a stable assignment, they
need to be assigned to the activity a.
• If the dummies of vi are assigned to the void activity and none of the players corre-
sponding to the sets including vi (denoted by S(vi)) is assigned to the activity c2, then
these players will form a blocking coalition of size β(vi) and deviate to activity b.
Construction details. For each vi ∈ V , we let S(vi) = {Sj | vi ∈ Sj ∈ S } and
β(vi) = i + 3k + 1 and create a set Dummy(vi) = {d(1)i , d(2)i , . . . , d(β(vi)−|S(vi)|)i } of dummy
players. For each i ∈ [3k] the number β(vi) is the target coalition size when all players in
S(vi) are engaged in activity b, together with the players in Dummy(vi). We then create an
edge between any pair of players.
The agents’ preferences over alternatives are defined as follows. For each Sj ∈ S, we let
Bj = {b} × {β(vi) | vi ∈ Sj }. The preferences of each player Sj ∈ S are given by
Sj : (c2, k)  Bj  (c1, n− k)  (a∅, 1).
For each vi ∈ V the dummy players in Dummy(vi) only approve the alternative (b, β(vi)).
Finally, the preferences of players x1, x2, and x3 are given by
x1 : (c1, 2) ∼ (c2, 2)  (a, 3)  (a∅, 1)
x2 : (a, 2)  (c1, 2) ∼ (c2, 2)  (a, 3)  (a∅, 1)
x3 : (a, 3)  (c1, 1) ∼ (c2, 1)  (a, 2)  (a∅, 1).
Notice that the preferences of x1, x2, and x3, when restricted to {a, c1, a∅} × [1, 2, 3] or
{a, c2, a∅} × [1, 2, 3], form an empty core instance (Example 4).
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We will show that (V,S) contains an exact cover if and only if there exists a core stable
feasible assignment.
Correctness. Suppose that (V,S) admits an exact cover S ′. Then, we construct a feasible
assignment pi by setting pi(xi) = a for i = 1, 2, 3, pi(Sj) = c2 for Sj ∈ S ′, pi(Sj) = c1 for
Sj ∈ S \ S ′, and assigning the remaining players to the void activity. Clearly, no subset
together with ci (i = 1, 2) or a strongly blocks pi. We will show that no subset T together
with activity b strongly blocks pi. Suppose towards a contradiction that such a subset
T exists; as no players in {x1, x2, x3} approves alterntives of b, it must be the case that
|T | = β(vi) for some vi ∈ V and hence T consists of agents who approve (b, β(vi)), i.e.,
T = S(vi) ∪ Dummy(vi) for some vi ∈ V . However, since S ′ is an exact cover, there is
an agent Sj ∈ S ′ ∩ S(vi) with pi(Sj) = c2, and this agent prefers (c2, k) to (b, β(vi)), a
contradiction. Hence, pi is core stable.
Conversely, suppose that there exists a core stable feasible assignment pi and let S ′ =
{Sj ∈ S | pi(Sj) = c2 }. We will show that S ′ is an exact cover. Observe that by individual
rationality, the only agents who can be allocated to a are the players x1, x2, and x3. Hence,
by core stability, both activities c1 and c2 must be allocated outside of the players x1, x2,
and x3; otherwise, no core stable outcome would exist as we have seen in Example 4. The
only indivudally rational way to do this is to assign activity c2 to k players from S, and
assign activity c1 to the remaining n− k players in S. Thus, |S ′| = k. Then, no player in S
can be engaged in activity b, and hence, by individual rationality, all dummy players must
be assigned to the void activity. Now suppose towards a contradiction that S ′ is not a cover,
i.e., there exists an element vi ∈ V such that S(vi)∩S ′ = ∅. This would mean that pi assigns
all players in S(vi) to the activity c1, and hence the coalition S(vi) ∪ Dummy(vi) together
with the activity b strongly blocks pi, contradicting the stability of pi.
Appendix. Proofs omitted from Section 6
Proof of Theorem 31
Proof. We describe a parameterized reduction from the W[1]-hard Multicolored Clique
problem. Given an undirected graph G = (V,E), a positive integer h ∈ N, and a vertex
coloring φ : V → [h], Multicolored Clique asks whether G admits a colorful h-clique,
that is, a size-h vertex subset Q ⊆ V such that the vertices in Q are pairwise adjacent and
have pairwise distinct colors. Without loss of generality, we assume that there are exactly q
vertices of each color for some q ∈ N, and that there are no edges between vertices of the
same color.
Let (G, h, φ) be an instance of Multicolored Clique with G = (V,E). For convenience,
we write V (i) = {v(i)1 , . . . , v(i)q } to denote the set of vertices of color i for every i ∈ [h]. We
construct our gGASP instance as follows. We have one vertex activity v for each vertex v ∈ V ,
one edge activity e for each edge e ∈ E, three color activities ai, bi, and ci for each color i ∈ [h],
three colorpair activities a{ij}, b{ij}, and c{ij} for each color pair {i, j} ⊆ [h], i 6= j, and four
other additional activities d, x, y, and z.
Idea. We will have one color gadget Color(i) for each color i ∈ [h], one colorpair gadget
ColorPair({i, j}) for each color pair {i, j}, i 6= j, and one empty IS-instance Ng = {g1, g2, g3}
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together with the stabilizer g. For most of the possible assignments, these gadgets will be
unstable, unless the following holds:
1. For each color i ∈ [h] the first two players from the color gadget select a vertex of
color i (by being assigned together to the corresponding vertex activity).
2. For each color pair {i, j} ⊆ [h], i 6= j the first two players of the colorpair gadget select
an edge connecting one vertex of color i and one vertex of color j (by being assigned
together to the corresponding edge activity).
3. Every selected edge for the color pair {i, j} must be incident to both vertices selected
for color i and color j.
4. The stabilizer g as well as the players in Ng are engaged in the activity d.
If the four conditions above hold, then the assignment must encode a colorful h-clique.
Construction details. The color gadget Color(i), i ∈ [h] consists of the following three
players.
p
(i)
1 : (v
(i)
1 , 2)  E(v(i)1 )× [3, 5]  (v(i)2 , 2)  E(v(i)2 )× [3, 5]  · · ·  (v(i)q , 2)  E(v(i)q )× [3, 5] 
(bi, 2)  (ai, 1)  (ci, 3)  (ci, 2)  (ci, 1)  (a∅, 1),
p
(i)
2 : (v
(i)
q , 2)  E(v(i)q )× [3, 5]  (v(i)q−1, 2)  E(v(i)q−1)× [3, 5]  · · ·  (v(i)1 , 2)  E(v(i)1 )× [3, 5] 
(ci, 3)  (ci, 2)  (ai, 2)  (bi, 2)  (bi, 1)  (a∅, 1),
p
(i)
3 : (ci, 3)  (ai, 2)  (ai, 1)  (a∅, 1),
where E(v) to denote the set of activities corresponding to edges incident to vertex v for
every v ∈ V .
The colorpair gadget ColorPair({i, j}), {i, j} ⊆ [h], i 6= j, consists of three players.
p
{i,j}
1 : E({i, j})× [2, 5]  (b{ij}, 2)  (a{ij}, 1)  (c{ij}, 3)  (c{ij}, 2)  (c{ij}, 1)  (a∅, 1)
p
{i,j}
2 : E({i, j})× [2, 5]  (c{ij}, 3)  (c{ij}, 2)  (a{ij}, 2)  (b{ij}, 2)  (c{ij}, 1)  (a∅, 1), and
p
{i,j}
3 : (c{ij}, 3)  (a{ij}, 2)  (a{ij}, 1)  (a∅, 1)
where E({i, j}) denotes the set of edge activities incident to vertices of color i and j.
There is a stabilizer player g with the following preferences.
g : E × [4, 5]  (d, 4)  (a∅, 1).
The set Ng consists of three players.
g1 : (d, 4)  (y, 2)  (z, 1)  (x, 3)  (x, 2)  (x, 1)  (a∅, 1),
g2 : (d, 4)  (x, 3)  (x, 2)  (z, 2)  (y, 2)  (y, 1)  (a∅, 1),
g3 : (d, 4)  (x, 3)  (z, 2)  (z, 1)  (a∅, 1).
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We take the underlying social network to be a complete graph. Together, there are
3h+ 3
(
h
2
)
+ 4 players, namely
N =
⋃
i∈[h]
Color(i) ∪
⋃
i 6=j∈[h]
ColorPair({i, j}) ∪ {g} ∪Ng.
Note that the number of players depends on h, but not on n, and the size of our instance of
gGASP is bounded by O(n2 +m2).
Correctness. We will now argue that the graph G admits a colorful clique of size h if and
only if our instance of gGASP admits a Nash stable feasible assignment or an individually
stable feasible assignment.
Suppose that there exists a colorful clique H of size h. We construct a Nash stable
assignment pi where
• the first two players p(i)1 and p(i)2 of the color gadget Color(i) are assigned to the activity
corresponding to the vertex of color i from H,
• the last player p(i)3 of the color gadget Color(i) is assigned to the activity ai,
• the first two players p{i,j}1 and p{i,j}2 of the colorpair gadget ColorPair({i, j}) are assigned
to the activity corresponding to the edge between the vertices of color i and j in H,
• the last player p{i,j}3 of the colorpair gadget ColorPair({i, j}) is assigned to the activity
a{ij}, and
• the stabilizer g and the players in Ng are assigned to the activity d.
Observe that for a successful Nash deviation a player must join an existing non-empty
coalition, because no player prefers a size-one activity to the currently assigned one. By
construction, the last player of each color gadget and the last player of the colorpair
gadget cannot deviate (no other players engage in an approved activity). Consider the first
two players of a color gadget Color(i). They cannot deviate to a vertex activity, because
their current activity is their only approved vertex activity that has some players assigned
to it. They cannot deviate to an edge activity either, because they would only prefer
edge activities corresponding to edges that are not incident to the vertex of color i; these
activities, however, have no players assigned to them. The first two players of each colorpair
gadget ColorPair({i, j}) and the players in Ng do not wish to deviate since they are each
assigned to their top alternative. Finally, the stabilizer g does not wish to deviate since
there is no coalition of size 3 or 4 assigned to an edge activity. Thus, we have a Nash stable
feasible assignment, and hence, an individually stable assignment.
Conversely, suppose that there exists an individually stable feasible assignment pi. Then,
pi must assign the activity d to the stabilizer as well as the players in Ng; otherwise, pi cannot
be stable as we have seen in Example 5. Likewise, the first two players of each colorpair
gadget ColorPair({i, j}) must be assigned to the same edge activity corresponding to some
edge eˆi,j ∈ E. We say that these players “select edge eˆi,j”.
Now suppose towards a contradiction that the first player p
(i)
1 of color gadget Color(i) is
assigned to an edge activity eˆi,j incident to vertices of color i and j. Then, such a coalition
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has size in [3, 5] by individual rationality, and must not contain the stabilizer g, because g has
to be engaged in activity d as discussed before. Hence the player p
(i)
1 can only be assigned
to eˆi,j together with p
(i)
2 and the first two players from the colorpair gadget ColorPair({i, j}),
which results in a coalition of size 3 or 4. This would, however, cause an IS-deviation by the
stabilizer g to the edge activity eˆi,j , a contradiction. The same argument applies to when
the second player p
(i)
2 is assigned to an edge activity. Therefore, the first two players of
each color gadget Color(i) are assigned to the same vertex activity corresponding to some
vertex v`i ∈ V (i). We say that these players “select vertex v`i”. (Note that at this point, the
coalition structure of any stable outcome is already fixed: The first two players of each color
gadget and of each colorpair gadget must form a coalition of size two, respectively, and all
other players must be form singleton coalitions.)
Now, assume towards a contradiction that the selected vertices and edges do not form a
colorful clique of size h. The size and colorfulness are clear from the construction. Hence,
there must be some pair {v`i , v`j} of selected vertices that are not adjacent. However, this
would imply that colorpair gadget ColorPair({i, j}) selected an edge that is not incident to
vertex v`i or not incident to vertex v`j . Without loss of generality let it be non-incident to
vertex v`i . Now, there are two cases. First, if eˆi,j ∈ E(v(i)x ) with x < `i, then player p(i)1
would have an IS-deviation to the activity corresponding to eˆi,j . Second, if eˆi,j ∈ E(v(i)x )
with x > `i, then player p
(i)
2 would have an IS-deviation to the activity corresponding to eˆi,j .
In both cases we have a contradiction to the assumption that pi is individually stable. A
similar argument applies to the case when there is a Nash stable assignment.
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